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ABSTRACT
During the Roman Republic, a dictator usually acted as a temporary military commander
with supreme authority. When the crisis was over, the dictator resigned, as his term was tightly
restricted to six-months. The dictatorship was a reliable emergency response for centuries (501201 BCE). It appeared regularly from the first decade of the Republic through the Second Punic
War. Although the job description sounds straightforward, no single fact about the Roman
dictatorship is easily definable. Traditional arguments about the dictatorship have focused on
famous military dictators and their tactical actions in battle. This has limited our discussion of
the dictatorship, which has often led the office to be misunderstood or simplified. The office was
not static, but constantly adapted. Dictators served in multiple roles during the Republic,
including completing rituals, holding elections, and calming riots. While modern scholars have
revealed new nuanced perspectives on the Republic, there has been little update to the
conventional understanding of the dictatorship. In order to move away from excessively
legalistic interpretations of the Republic, this study examines the sixty-seven dictators that
appear in the ancient historian Livy’s comprehensive work. By examining detailed descriptions
of a variety of dictators, it is possible to reconsider standard notions of the dictatorship. This
investigation reveals the Roman dictatorship to be a complex and constantly evolving institution,
which reflected the Republic’s shift from an exclusive aristocracy towards experimenting with
popular sovereignty.
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I. Introduction
In 392 BCE, rumor overwhelmed the city of Rome. According to Livy, “there was
something like panic” in the streets. An embellished tale of an unsuccessful battle swirled
throughout the city and terrified the citizens.1 Romans feared that their Etruscan adversaries were
rapidly approaching the city walls. Frightened women “flocked to the temples,” frantic to gain
divine protection for their homes.2 Amidst the fearful chaos, Marcus Furious Camillus was
appointed dictator. Livy wrote that “courage and hope were renewed,” as Camillus’s
appointment brought instant relief to the city.3
The new dictator quickly leapt into action. Camillus worked to restore the army’s
confidence and to conscript new reinforcements. Romans were ready and willing to enlist in the
fight, and even allies were eager to assist Camillus’s efforts. He soon led his assembled legions
into a “brilliantly successful” engagement.4 Encouraged by this feat, Camillus turned his
attention to the Etruscans’ wealthiest city, Veii. He ingeniously organized his men to dig long
tunnels under Veii’s walls.5 Finally, the dictator made vows to the gods and led his men into the
enemy city. Pouring over the walls and emerging from the tunnel, they attacked from all sides. A
“terrible slaughter” ensued and Camillus claimed victory for Rome.6
The dictator and his men stripped the city of its vast wealth and brought home immense
spoils. Camillus returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph, a city-wide celebration awarded to a
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conquering general.7 Romans of every class filled the streets in unprecedented numbers to honor
the dictator. Camillus’s triumphal parade was so impressive that he worried it was impious.8
After a decade of continuous war fought by lesser commanders, “the world’s greatest general”
defeated Veii in his single campaign.9
Although not every Roman dictatorship was as dramatic and glorious, the office played a
fascinating role in the development of the Republic. Camillus represents only a piece of the
institution’s complex history. A dictator was an emergency command position that Livy called
“the usual practice in times of crisis.”10 From disparate sources and fragments of evidence,
modern scholars have created a basic job description for the office. A typical reference entry
defines a dictator as six-month emergency military position, appointed to hold complete and
incontestable authority, alongside a magister equitum to act as second-in-command. After
centuries of consistent appointments (501-201 BCE), it is usually noted that “the post fell into
disuse” until Sulla revived the dictatorship in 82 BCE.11 In a final appearance, Caesar
intermittently used the title of dictator from 49 to 44 BCE.12 These two last dictatorships are
usually considered to be entirely separate from the dictators of the earlier Republic.13 While there
are certainly elements of truth in this general discourse, no aspect of the dictatorship can be so
simply defined.
Recent scholarship has methodically reconsidered the Roman Republic. Instead of seeing
a single, fixed Republic founded in 509 and destroyed in the first century BCE, new work aims
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See Beard, The Roman Triumph; Pittenger, Contested Triumphs.
Livy 5. 22-23.
9
Livy 5. 23.
10
Livy 4. 18.
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Gizewski, s.v. "Dictator," Gizewski, Brill's New Pauly, 375.
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Marcus Antonius formally banned the office after Caesar’s death in 44 BCE.
13
Drogula, Commanders & Command, 179; Niebuhr, The History of Rome, Volume 1, 498.
8
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to highlight the era’s nuances and transformations.14 The office of the dictator, however, has not
been given the same treatment. Over the Republic’s 500 years, Rome transitioned from the
domination of a guarded aristocracy towards being swayed by popular sovereignty. Yet, the
dictatorship is still widely portrayed as a static office, only changed by two power-hungry men,
Sulla and Caesar, in the late Republic. Scholars focus on one category of dictators, who usually
fit the ideal archetype of Camillus. There is a decided emphasis on dictators’ tactics and
maneuvers during combat. A one-dimensional view, built only on the actions of famous
dictators, does not allow us to track the office’s evolution or complexities. This oversimplified
interpretation of the dictatorship requires an update. Upon closer examination, the dictatorship
was implemented for a variety of reasons and developed alongside the Republic.
Reconsidering the dictatorship, however, is fraught. Records of the early Roman
Republic are scarce and riddled with mysteries. In this study, I evaluate our understanding of the
dictatorship using the ancient historian Livy’s account as a foundation. His writing spans the
early and middle Republic and offers the only surviving record of certain events. Livy’s
comprehensiveness is an asset in exploring the dictatorship. He allows us to examine a variety of
less celebrated dictators, the wider context and consequences of dictatorships, and the office’s
changes throughout the Republic. To challenge the standard narrative of the office, I catalogued
every dictatorship that Livy mentioned and took note of the conditions surrounding their
appointment and the usage of their office. This work is referred to throughout and included as an
appendix.15
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See historiography discussion in Chapter II, “History and Historiography,” especially Flower, Roman Republics.
Appendix A.
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Using Livy’s narrative, I reconsider the origins of the office, the men who were
appointed, the powers of a dictator, the circumstances surrounding appointments, the
appointment process, ceremonial and religious aspects, the role of the magister equitum, and
resignations. I find that the Roman dictatorship was decidedly complex and exceptionally
flexible. Perhaps beyond any other office, the dictatorship of the early Republic was responsive
to changes in the political system. The dictatorship was, as Livy emphasized, a response to an
emergency or crisis. Therefore, the office was necessarily adjusted each time it was
implemented. Each dictator filled Rome’s particular needs at a moment in time. The position was
adaptable, and therefore mirrors the Republic’s development.
Academic discussions often attempt to explain the Republic in simple legalistic terms,
and this restrictive paradigm has also shaped our understanding of the dictatorship. As a result,
examinations of the office are often filled with inaccurate generalizations. In an attempt to
approach the dictatorship more holistically, I consider the dictators who completed mundane
tasks within the city alongside illustrious generals. By expanding rigid definitions of the
dictatorship, this investigation will also confront conventional ideas about the supposed nature of
Republican politics. Livy allows us to reconsider assumed facts about the dictatorship. As a
result, we can reevaluate the institution and its implications for the study of the Roman Republic.

5

II. History and Historiography
The Roman Republic existed for almost 500 years (509-49 BCE).16 Generally, dictators
are separated between so-called “true Republican dictators” versus the dictatorships of Sulla and
Caesar.17 This periodization creates one era to encompass every dictator from 501 through 201
BCE, a total of sixty-seven (in Livy), and a second category that contains only two: Sulla and
Caesar.18 I find this to be a vast oversimplification, as the dictatorship’s use changed
significantly before Sulla redefined the office in 82 BCE. The Republic had a considerable
variety of dictators, allowing us to track a steady evolution from “true Republican dictators,”19 to
an altered version during the third century BCE’s Second Punic War.
Livy’s narrative encompassed many periods of political development and innovation.
Harriet Flower presented a compelling model of multiple sub-stages of the Republic, which can
help us understand the progression of these changes. According to Flower, after Rome’s regal
era, there were two Pre-Republic periods of “political experimentation,” followed by a patriciancentric initial form of the Republic, and finally a more stable system led by a mixed-class
nobility that existed until approximately 300 BCE.20 The difficult Second Punic War emerged in
the middle of one more stage, dominated by a further evolution of the nobility. In examining the
dictatorship, these segments offer a useful timeline. The dictatorship first appeared in Livy
during a chaotic transitional period and persisted throughout significant reforms to the original
system. Rome developed from a tight aristocracy towards popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, as

Flower, “Introduction,” 2. These are the traditional dates for the Republic, which are debatable.
Sulla and Caesar will not be considered in the body of this study, see Chapter IV “Conclusion” for brief
discussion; Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 298.
18
See Appendix A.
19
Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 298-299. Keyes proposed that the dictatorship
took a new form during the Second Punic War; Golden, Crisis Management, 11-40. Golden also notes the
dictatorship’s transformations.
20
Flower, Roman Republics, 48-53.
16
17
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Harris noted, the Republican system is, “not to be confused with democracy.”21 In fact, no
modern system of government can properly describe the Republic’s complex system.
Rome lacked a written constitution. This allowed for the constant renegotiation of the
“calibrated cooperation between Senate, People, and magistrates.”22 Through every stage of the
Republic, the balance of power continually shifted. Rome’s top magistrates were the two
consuls, elected each year. The Senate, which was made up of the older elite, generally
functioned as an advisory board to elected officials. At the beginning of the Republic, all
political offices were held by wealthy aristocrats, including the dictatorship.23 Religion was
another key government function, also controlled by the elite.24 Public religion focused on
safeguarding the city’s future through traditional rituals and ceremonies. To be pious was to
respect these ancient customs, and in turn Rome won military success.25 In the early Republic,
the people had little power; they were only able to express opinions through limited and
regimented participation in assemblies and elections.26
There were ostensibly two classes at the start of the Republic.27 In basic terms, the
patricians were the rich and powerful aristocrats, while the plebeians were the lower class
common people. The plebeians’ political role—and the dictatorship—began to change
significantly during the height of what is called the Struggle of the Orders. Domestic unrest and

21

Harris, Roman Power, 68.
Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition,” 15; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 15. This is
essentially the thesis of Lintott’s entire monograph.
23
Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 17; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 32.
24
Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 198; North, “Democratic Politics,” 17.
25
Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 38; Harris, Roman Power, 49; Le Bohec, “Roman Wars and
Armies in Livy,” 117; Scheid, “Livy and Religion,” 82-83; Rüpke, “Communicating with the Gods,” 216.
26
Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 57; North, “Democratic Politics,” 15.
27
This is a complicated issue, as the actual divisions and differences between these classes are debated. There are no
definite answers, but for discussions see Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic,” 163-164; Cornell, The
Beginnings of Rome, 251-265; Forsythe, “The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 317-318.
22
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resulting reform characterized this period, which spanned from 494 to 287 BCE.28 The ongoing
class conflict involved the populace continually pushing for the ruling patricians to pass laws that
allowed more plebeian rights and admission to offices. This process incrementally gave more
privilege and political access to the lower class, which transformed Rome’s aristocracy and its
institutions.29 The tumultuous politics of this conflict produced a new blended nobility.
Another significant moment in the Republic’s history came during the third century BCE.
In 218-201 BCE, Rome fought the Second Punic War against Carthage. This war operated at an
unprecedented scale, challenging Rome’s usual military success. Brennan fittingly called the
war, “virtually one continuous state of emergency,” which naturally led to changes in political
practice.30 Unsurprisingly, dictators were appointed regularly during these seventeen years of
conflict. Rome was also experimenting with new forms of power during this time, as well as
extensions of command.31 Additionally, the Senate took a more influential and involved role in
the third century BCE, likely in response to the traumatic war.32 The last dictator (before Sulla)
appeared in 201 BCE, the final year of the Second Punic War.33 By this juncture, the Republic
had changed considerably from its foundation. Even still, scholars routinely fail to acknowledge
any variation in the dictatorship. Current research generally agrees that the Republic constantly
evolved, yet dictators are often excluded from this model of perpetual transformation.
The dictatorship occupies an odd space within Roman historiography. It appears in nearly
every piece of writing or record about the Republic, but complex discussions are limited. In part,
Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 17-19.
The extent of these conflicts is debated, see Forsythe, “The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 317;
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 237-344; Raaflaub, “Between Myth and History,” 141.
30
Brennan, “Power and Process,” 57.
31
Rich, “Fear, Greed, and Glory,” 50-51; Brennan, “Power and Process,” 39-40; Lintott, The Constitution of the
Roman Republic, 113.
32
Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 33.
33
Livy 30. 39-40.
28
29
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this is because, as Christian Gizewski in Brill’s New Pauly aptly defined, the history of the
Roman dictatorship is “shrouded in mystery.”34 When scholars present the office in greater
detail, they often portray the dictatorship as antithetical to the Republican political system, which
otherwise emphasized shared power and restrictions on magistrates.35 The office is often
presented as a deviation from Roman values. This traditional model of the dictatorship comes
from Theodor Mommsen’s History of Rome, his canonical work published in three volumes over
1854-1856 (in the original German). Mommsen stated that a dictator was meant to, “revive
temporarily the regal authority,” and had disdain for the institution’s similarity to kingship.36 He
saw dictators as counter to the Rome’s careful divisions of power. In his mind, the Republic’s
system of checks and balances led to the eventual abandonment of the “all-along unpopular
institution” of the dictatorship.37 Mommsen defined Roman politics in narrowly legalistic terms,
frequently focused on class divisions.38 He often reduced political action to elite ambition or
class warfare. This lens is unsurprising, as Mommsen’s work came less than a decade after Karl
Marx’s Communist Manifesto, written in 1848. Mommsen saw the dictatorship as an oppressive
tool of the elite. While he was correct that the office was tied to the aristocracy, his contempt for
the dictator’s individual power produced a simplistic viewpoint. Mommsen viewed Rome’s
political history as a linear march away from monarchy, which led him to inaccurately
characterize the dictatorship as an anomaly from usual practice.39

Gizewski, “Dictator,” 375. For discussion of the institution’s history, see Chapter III-a “The Origins of the
Institution.”
35
Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 303; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227; Mommsen, History
of Rome: Volume 1, 251.
36
Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 252.
37
Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 3, 56.
38
Jehne, “Methods, Models, and Historiography,” 33.
39
Mommsen, The History of Rome: Volume 1, 252, 296, 335.
34

9

Mommsen’s interpretation continues to permeate modern study. Any scholar who writes
about the dictatorship unavoidably addresses Mommsen and must accept or reject certain
specifics of his argument. While the dictatorship is still widely treated as irregular, nuance has
been added to Mommsen’s depiction of the office. The Roman dictatorship is no longer utterly
villainized. Yet, it is still seen as abnormal because it was non-collegial and granted total power.
T.J. Cornell called the office a “partial exception” to Rome’s balance of power. He wrote that the
dictator and his magister equitum were a “remarkable set of institutions.” Cornell found that the
dictator’s role as an emergency response with a six-month term “had no parallel…in Italy or
anywhere else in the Mediterranean.”40 Similarly, Gregory K. Golden called it a “most unusual
Roman magistracy.”41 Just as Mommsen was colored by the politics of his time, newer
interpretations often suffer from perpetuating what William Harris called, “Rome’s imaginary
democracy.”42 In the same vein, John A. North warned that democracy was “explosive
terminology” which produces misinterpretations of the Republic.43 Harris and North were
principally reacting to Fergus Millar, who emphasized the democratic role of the people in the
Republic.44 While Rome certainly made strides towards popular sovereignty during the Republic,
it was far from any modern conception of a democracy.45 The dictatorship was not an aberration,
but symptomatic of an aristocratic system. While scholars now acknowledge the ambiguous
aspects of the office, there has been little redefinition of our understanding of dictators.
Many of the dictatorship’s obscurities stem from absent source material. Unfortunately,
the early history of Rome is challenging to study. The ancient sources are not only limited in

40

Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 226-227.
Golden, Crisis Management, 11.
42
Harris, Roman Power, 10-11.
43
North, “Democratic Politics,” 15.
44
Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic.
45
Harris, Roman Power, 68.
41
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number, but also obscured by missing information and elements of myth.46 Key records come
from the fasti, lists of elected officials and public events, that formed a general outline of Roman
political history.47 A few narrative accounts have survived, but are also incomplete. The Greek
historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote Roman Antiquities, which covered the founding myth
through 264 BCE. Unfortunately, we only have his full account through 443 BCE.48 He wrote at
roughly the same time as Livy, covering much of the same material, but with a different aim.49
Besides the obvious gaps in information, scholars also find that Dionysus’s account was clouded
by an overt focus on the Greek role in Roman developments.50 Other notable ancient historians,
like Polybius, do not cover the early Republican period, which was a vital time for the
development of the Roman dictatorship.51
A crucial account of this era comes from Roman historian Livy, who lived between 59
BCE–17 CE. Although only thirty-five of one hundred and forty-two volumes have survived,
Livy’s Books from the Foundation of the City (Ab urbe condita libri) offer one of the most
comprehensive histories of early Rome.52 Unlike many historians of the time, he “led a quiet and
regular existence,” and never served in political office or the army.53 Livy seems to have spent a
considerable amount of his life living and writing in Rome, essentially a career historian. 54 As a

Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 57; Oakley, “The Early Republic, 15-16; Armstrong, War and Society, 1-8.
See Appendix B for discussion of fasti; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 13; Armstrong, War and Society, 2627; Livy perhaps preferred fasti to other sources, see Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 69.
48
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 2.
49
Forsythe, “The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 315; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 2.
50
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 37; Culham, “Women in the Roman Republic,” 140.
51
At least, the period is not covered in surviving work. For discussion of Polybius, see Lintott, The Constitution of
the Roman Republic, 16-26.
52
Livy’s life is the subject of debate, see Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 25; The number of
volumes could also be as high as 150, see Bessone, “The Periochae,” 435; Briscoe, "Livy," 376. As seen here, even
in reference works Livy is cited as the standard for the era.
53
Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 27. Despite the significance of his work, only the broad strokes of Livy’s personal
history are known. The limited sources indicate that he was born in Patavium, modern Padua in Italy.
54
Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 27.
46
47
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result, Livy’s writing provides an extensive body of work, but lacks a grounding in practical
experience, especially in military affairs. As P.G. Walsh described, “the wonder is that being
neither Senator nor soldier nor avid traveller he got so much right.”55 This investigation of the
dictatorship, however, is concerned with political evolutions, not the minutiae of combat.
Subsequently, any of Livy’s inaccurate portrayals of warfare bear little importance.
Thematically, Livy’s primary concern was the decline of Roman morality. Leaning on his
study of philosophy, he emphasized emotion and historical characters, and employed a variety of
paraphrased speeches, which crafted moral lessons for readers.56 Like any historian, his writing
was undoubtedly influenced by the problems of his day. During Livy’s time, the Republic was in
almost complete disintegration.57 In the aftermath of the civil wars that rocked the first century
BCE, Livy was seeking to redefine a muddled “Roman national identity.”58 As he wrote, a period
of disorder was capped by the rise of the emperor Augustus. Living under the new stability of a
nascent imperial system, it is not unthinkable that Livy appreciated, or at least accepted,
individual rule. Livy had a controversial (and much debated) association with Augustus,
although the nature of their relationship is unclear, and perhaps even fraught.59 A shared
reverence for Republican values meant that Livy and Augustus both idealized early Rome, which
was likely their main connection.60 The problems Livy saw in his own time made him nostalgic

Walsh, “Livy,” 115-142.
Ogilvie, “Introduction,” 12; Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 72; Walsh, “Livy,” 121, 129.
57
Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 25.
58
Pittenger, Contested Triumphs, 2.
59
This connection may have allowed him access to more records, but also brings up issues of bias. There are many
different discussions, see Ogilvie, “Introduction,” 11. Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 64, 66; Le Bohec, “Roman Wars
and Armies,” 130; Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 25-34; Walsh, “Livy,” 120; Mineo, “Livy’s
Political and Moral Values and the Principate,” 126-136. Mineo does not cast Livy as a fervent supporter, but
“perfectly aware” of Augustus’s “political exploitation.”
60
Gaertner "Livy's Camillus,” 28; Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 34; Pittenger, Contested
Triumphs, 14-15; Walsh, “Livy,” 120; For Augustus’s use of the early Republic see Tacitus, Annals, 1.3; Harris,
Roman Power, 100; Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition,” 15.
55
56
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for the piety and ethics that he found (or created) in the stories about the early Republic.61 Heroic
leaders like Camillus showed immense restraint and commitment to the state despite their
substantial power.
Despite his usefulness, scholars often criticize Livy for inconsistent use of sources. In
some cases, he seemed to omit, alter, or perhaps misinterpret information.62 Livy himself
admitted that the events of his first five books (753-386 BCE) are “like objects dimly perceived
in the far distance," based on “few written records.”63 He blamed the lack of solid information on
a fire during the Gallic Sack of Rome in 386 BCE, which burned many documents.64 In spite of
such limitations, Livy’s history is uniquely expansive, simply unmatched by contemporaries.65
Even though his speeches and stories contain many creative liberties, they are meant to teach a
lesson and therefore reveal a set of Roman ideals.66 Livy’s history is not definitive, but his access
to records and viewpoint offer invaluable insight into how Romans viewed their political systems
and its history, including the dictatorship. Livy’s perspective as a Roman gave him value as a
cultural resource, which offers a distinct view from Greek historians like Polybius or Dionysius
of Halicarnassus. 67 Livy’s surviving work included a dictator about every three years, providing
an excellent window into the office’s role within Rome’s greater history.68 Jaeger fittingly wrote
Walsh, “Livy,” 119.
Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 57; Gaertner, "Livy's Camillus,” 43; Drummond, “The Dictator Years,” 552; Levene,
“Allusions and Intertextuality,” 211.
63
Livy 6. 1.
64
Livy 6 .1. The same fire is blamed for the loss of many early Roman records, including additional fasti; Badian,
“The Early Historians,” 2; Armstrong, War and Society, 242-244. Armstrong used Plutarch to argue that better
records post-Gallic sack are actually because of improved bureaucracy, not a fire.
65
Walsh, “Livy,” 129.
66
Pittenger, Contested Triumphs, 20.
67
It is also important to acknowledge the inherent difficulties of working with a translated text. This study works
with an English translation of Livy’s original Latin work. There is certainly debate within the field about appropriate
translation of various passages or phrases. Consideration of semantics is not absent in this study, as the scholarly
work I reference frequently examines the original Latin. When necessary, I implement Latin words or phrases,
especially for key terminology. Additional explanation of these terms is provided in the footnotes when appropriate.
68
See Appendix A. We have dictators in Livy from 501-302 BCE (199 years) plus 217-201 BCE (sixteen years),
meaning sixty-seven dictators over 215 years, which averages to a dictator about every 3.2 years. Golden (Crisis
61
62
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that Livy “creates and maintains a sense of crisis.” 69 This attention to catastrophe lends itself to a
study of an emergency position. In short, Livy’s retrospective narrative of the dictatorship is
suited to the task of examining important evolutions in the politics of the Roman Republic.

Management, 25) found a similar statistic, even though his study of the dictatorship is not centered on Livy, and at
times omits certain categories of dictator.
69
Jaeger, Livy’s Written Rome, 8.
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III. Livy’s Dictators
In order to illuminate the dictatorship’s role within the Republic, this study examines the
peculiarities and debates surrounding the various facets of the position. This chapter deals with
eight aspects of the dictatorship. Each section aims to reconsider canonical notions of the
dictatorship with a close reading of Livy’s history. By investigating the specifics of how and why
the dictatorship was implemented, we can better understand the office’s complexity, highlight
openings for further research, and reveal features of the Republican system that are often
overlooked.
a. The Origins of The Institution
Modern historians do not know the precise origin of the dictatorship.70 It appears that
many ancient historians were likewise in the dark. Livy’s first dictator took office in 501 BCE,
less than a decade after the fall of Rome’s monarchy.71 Although he recounted the story of this
dictatorship, Livy admitted that the exact name and identity were disputed even among early
historians.72 The question of the dictatorship’s early history is still unsolved. Mommsen
definitively classified the office as a Republican creation, which set the standard for
contemporary scholars.73 Mommsen’s work emphasized a “doubtless” link between dictatorial
and consular powers, which suggested the offices were created concurrently at the start of the
Republic (traditionally 509 BCE).74 This viewpoint has undoubtedly colored subsequent
discussions. Even so, newer research indicates that the dictatorship may predate the Republic.
There are even indications of this in Livy, although he probably had little to no knowledge of

70

Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227-228.
Livy 2. 18.
72
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pre-Republican dictators (who came before both consuls and the fasti).75 In current scholarship, a
variety of theories have emerged to explain the dictatorship’s true origins. This debate is
emblematic of issues in the discourse surrounding the dictatorship, and the Republic more
broadly. Mommsen and his contemporaries offered valuable contributions to the field, but often
resorted to simplified accounts that relied on Roman exceptionalism. The conversation
surrounding the origins of the dictatorship demonstrates the value in questioning canonical
explanations of the Republic.
Mommsen’s view was built on the assumption that after the expulsion of the last king,
Rome quickly replaced the monarchy with two annually-elected consuls.76 Mommsen reasoned
that the two consuls represented the division of the king’s power (imperium) into two officials.77
Consuls, however, were not kings. Consuls were not only restricted by yearly terms, but each
also by their colleague.78 Livy stressed that “positions of political eminence could not be limited
in the scope of their jurisdiction, but they could be limited in duration,” which is reflected in both
the annual consulship and the six-month dictatorship.79 Romans felt a theoretical safety in term
limits, which helps to explain how the dictatorship could have existed in the aftermath of a fallen
monarchy. Following Mommsen’s logic, the imperium of a dictator was akin to a king, but this
was permissible because his tenure was tightly restricted.80 There is a substantial flaw in this
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logic. While Romans may have accepted the dictatorship at the start of the Republic, it seems
highly dubious that a new form of individual rule was created in this era.
Following the traditional timeline, the Republic was born out of anti-regal insurrection.
By most accounts, the Republic began after an aristocratic coup in 509 BCE.81 In Livy, the
Roman kings are largely depicted as oppressive. His history presented an ongoing disdain for
royalty, with declarations like, “the poorest in Rome hated the very name of ‘king’ as bitterly as
did the great.”82 It is additionally important to note that the Republic would have been
established in the wake of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus. Tarquin was notorious for his
exceptionally domineering regime.83 If this is true, the Roman Republic was born in a time that
deeply distrusted monarchical government. The dictatorship was a position which trusted a
supreme individual ruler. It seems unlikely that an institution of this sort would not have been
introduced directly after ousting an oppressive leader.84 Consequently, it seems probable that the
office, or some version of it, was in use before the overthrow.
Alternatively, the idea of a dramatic coup in 509 BCE may be misguided. While we have
acknowledged that the Republic was perpetually shifting, it is necessary to consider that the regal
era was just as dynamic. Modern scholars find that the Republic emerged more incrementally,
with several stages between absolute monarchy and the first consuls.85 Somewhere in this
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process, the dictatorship may have been created to bridge the gap between king and consuls.86
The titles of praetor maximus and magister populi come from the regal era and may suggest
dictator prototypes.87 Magister populi, which can be translated as “master of the citizen army,”
(hence military commander) is also used to refer the dictatorship.88 Before the Republic, a
magister populi may have been appointed for life, meaning the dictatorship may be a modified
version of this office.89 It has also been postulated that a praetor maximus was an “annual official
appointed by the king,” who eventually took over.90 The most compelling case for the dictator’s
development from praetor maximus appears in Livy. He wrote about a pre-Republic religious
ritual, to be completed by a “chief magistrate,” or praetor maximus.91 This ceremonial duty was
carried out by dictators during the Republic, perhaps linking the two positions.92 If nothing else,
Livy indicated a lineage between dictators and the old position of praetor maximus. Even if the
praetor maximus and magister populi were not direct antecedents of the dictator, it is reasonable
that the office evolved from one (or both) of these models. Basically, there may have been a
transitional stage between kings and consuls, in which some early prototype of the dictatorship
ruled over Rome.93 From this practice, the dictator and his magister equitum may have served as
a model for the collegiate consuls.94
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This interpretation also requires a more measured view of the kings. If Rome’s kings
were universally hated (as Mommsen told us), the dictatorship would not have been a favorable
option. While later kings certainly seem ruthless, some early monarchs appear to have been wellregarded leaders.95 Despite many statements against monarchy, Livy also credited the stability of
the strong kingship for allowing Rome to become “a politically adult nation.”96 Without the
guidance of a strong leader, he felt Rome would have succumbed to the “stormy sea of
democratic politics.”97 In this way, the dictatorship may have been a natural evolution of Rome’s
leadership. The shared power of consuls, not the dictatorship, was a drastically new form of rule.
Even amid the chaos of a new system, Rome may have used the familiar solitary power of a
dictatorship as backup plan. So, perhaps Romans were not hatefully afraid of kings, but simply
experimenting with new systems of governance
Current research also suggests that the dictatorship was not an entirely Roman creation.
Cornell found that Rome’s temporary dictatorship appears to be unique, but annual dictators
were used in nearby communities.98 Unlike in Rome, it seems that other Latin dictators were a
normal function of government, not an emergency protocol.99 Livy’s text may confirm this
influence from Latin and Greek political practices. Livy specifically mentioned an Alban dictator
being used after their king’s death in 760 BCE.100 Ridley argued that Livy actually meant to
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imply that the Roman dictatorship was taken from a Latin model.101 Regardless, substituting a
king for a dictator likely had precedent in the Latin world. It is difficult to argue that Rome was
not influenced by nearby political practices. Undeniably, Rome borrowed and modified other
state’s political institutions and symbology, even in its the earliest days.102 Consequently, the
Roman dictatorship could have been conceived much before the existence of Republic.
By reconsidering the dictatorship’s origins, we also challenge many canonical ideas about
the Republic’s creation. Dating the dictatorship to a messy period of political formation, or even
prior, is a move away from Roman exceptionalism. Mommsen and early writers tended to think
of Roman politics as self-contained, an argument which failed to address outside influences.103
Ignoring external inspiration allows writers to perpetuate Rome’s supremacy over neighboring
states, despite evidence to the contrary. The Republic and its institutions were not created in a
vacuum. The dictatorship seems to have a long history, perhaps even older than the Republic.
Mommsen confined the dictatorship (and the Republic) to an event, rather than a process. While
tidy, this logic generalizes a complicated period of development and limits our understanding of
the Roman Republic. The traditional view tends to isolate the dictatorship from Rome’s normal
political evolution, which misses the fundamental fact that Rome did not suddenly become a
democratic state after banishing the kings. The Romans also did not instantaneously create a
fully-formed Republic, nor a refined dictatorship. By viewing the dictatorship as emergent,
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rather than exceptional, we can additionally reconsider conventional simplifications of the
Republic.
b. The Men Who Became Dictator
The appointment of a dictator entrusted an individual with considerable power. The
office’s resemblance to kingship often leads it to be miscategorized as antithetical to Republican
values. Mommsen, for example, portrayed the dictatorship as, “the palladium of the conservative
party.”104 In the tradition of Mommsen, Drogula described the office as oppressively
conservative, calling it “the equivalent of a declaration of martial law.”105 This severe depiction
of the dictatorship may stem from misunderstanding the Republic as a democracy. Especially in
the early Republic, Rome was closely controlled by a small cluster of elite. Dictators (and all
politicians) were from this set of privileged patricians.106 Even when power was technically
shared between magistrates, authority remained in the same set of hands. In Livy’s account, the
dictatorship was the standard emergency response.107 Much closer to Livy, Cornell referred to
the office as a “partial exception” from normal distributions of power.108 Contrary to many
discussions, a temporary switch to individual power was not actually a risk or shift in the power
structure.
Upon closer examination, the dictatorship was not a deviation from the ordinary course of
Roman politics. The concept of fides, or trust, was essential to the general function of the
Republic.109 The ruling class trusted one another to act in the best interest of the state. The
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expectations that accompanied this trust were especially important for the informal regulation of
individuals who held power. Political offices rotated frequently, recycling what Pittenger called a
set of “functionally interchangeable” elite men.110 A typical career politician held a variety of
offices. There are countless examples in Livy. He mentioned men such as Gaius Junius
Bubulcus, who held office as consul, censor, and twice as dictator.111 Even still, the nomination
of a dictator was not taken lightly.
The dictatorship was a particularly revered appointment. Perhaps even more exclusive
than the consulship, it was reserved for established politicians.112 Livy told us that dictators were
frequently former consuls, especially in later years.113 He did not always specify that a dictator
had previously been consul, perhaps because his audience would have found this information
redundant.114 Dictators had all served in some significant capacity, sometimes adjacent to the
dictatorship as a previous magister equitum.115 Particularly in the guarded aristocracy of the early
Republic, dictators regularly took the office multiple times, and their sons often followed in their
footsteps. In a prominent example, Camillus was made dictator five times, and his son later
served twice.116 Consistently, the office was held by seasoned politicians. Livy repeatedly
indicated that dictators were respected and renowned. He often lauded appointees; he called one
110
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a “true prophet,” another was, “by the far the most distinguished soldier at the time,” and another
still was “regarded as foremost in military matters.”117 The men who served as dictator were not
mysterious figures. Any man with high enough standing to reach the dictatorship was already
vetted within the political community, either by blood or career (often both). While relatively
uncommon, the dictatorship was an attainable goal in a powerful Roman’s political career.
Accordingly, naming a dictator was not quite a leap of faith, at least during the early
Republic. The early ruling class was an especially tight group, which made (temporary)
individual power a safe option. The entire political community was small and homogenous; most
offices were seemingly held by a few established wealthy families.118 Consuls sometimes
appointed political allies to the dictatorship, or even a family member.119 The aristocracy was
also relatively unified in the early Republic, both politically and socially.120 The dictatorship’s
solitary power underlined this unity, providing a strong illustration of fides.121 Appointing a
dictator was also a means to manage substandard politicians. Admission into politics was
predicated on heredity, not skill.122 Thus, a dictatorship allowed the aristocracy to reinstate a
proven politician when an incompetent consul was in office. The nomination of a dictator was a
useful option in this climate; the elite were able to appoint a trusted man from within their ranks,
easily streamlining the governmental response to emergency.
Nonetheless, there were a few exceptions. I found Livy to mention only three plebeian
dictators, and all met considerable resistance from the aristocratic establishment.123 In 357 BCE,
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Livy described Rome’s first plebeian dictator, who was slowed down substantially by patrician
hostility.124 One plebeian dictator was appointed during his own consulship. An odd situation,
but also an illustration of how difficult it was for a plebeian to ascend to the dictatorship.125
These exclusionary norms were not limited to the dictatorship, by any means. All other political
positions were also notably aristocratic until the Struggle of the Orders.126
After the class reformations in the fourth century BCE, a new nobility was formed,
distinct from the early Republic’s strictly hereditary elite. In this system, individual power was
not as straightforward. The nobilitas included many wealthy plebeians.127 The new nobility was
less homogenous, larger, and somewhat less harmonious.128 Positions were open to a greater
number of Roman men, increasing competition. While there were still advantages for established
families within the nobilitas, the highest offices were no longer inherited.129 Instead of relying on
family legacy, competition ensured that Rome had quality magistrates. The Republic was still
not a democracy but was nonetheless becoming more inclusive. Trust was a less significant
factor, because officials needed to prove themselves in order to be elected. Livy’s last dictator
appeared in 201 BCE.130 By this time, the new ruling class was firmly established.
Mommsen believed that the dictatorship was abandoned after the third century BCE
because Romans loathed it,131 but this is unlikely. The dictatorship was probably not rejected, but
may have ceased to be a practical option. Rome was no longer controlled by a tight circle of elite
families. The pool of potential nominees was much larger and political interests were more
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varied. Appointing an individual commander was much more efficient and reliable within the
previous cohesive ruling class. Selecting a dictator in the new nobility would have been much
more complicated, and potentially controversial, as Rome was no longer controlled by a small
community of aristocrats. Understandably, individual power was probably far less attractive.
Whereas some define the dictatorship’s abandonment as a bold rejection of aristocracy, it
was truly just a natural political evolution. In the early Republic’s protected political ecosystem,
individuals from the small political community could be routinely trusted with supreme
power.132 Livy illustrated that the dictatorship did not represent a deviation from the early
aristocracy’s power structure. After the nobilitas emerged, the political system was much more
discordant. As a result, the politics of appointing a dictator were less clear cut. The dictatorship
was not uniquely undemocratic or repressive, but rather reflected the deeply aristocratic and
impenetrable political system of the early Republic. Furthermore, individual power did not
represent a substantial change, as the patrician men who served as dictator were already
“entrenched”133 in the system.
c. Power and Imperium
Dictators held imperium, a highly debated concept. In the simplest of reference
definitions, imperium was the “general military power of command.”134 This legal power of
command was invested in Rome’s highest offices, including the consuls, praetors, and the
dictator. Military authority was implicit to imperium, but its other dimensions were more
complex.135 The precise nature of imperium is an immense topic, which has received extensive
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scholarly discussion.136 In particular, the dictator’s imperium is incredibly unclear. Due to scarce
information, scholars generally define the dictator’s imperium via comparison to that of the
consulship. This proves to be the most discussed area of the dictatorship; scholars have debated a
dictator’s imperium and his relationship to the consuls ad nauseum.137 The inconsistences in
discussions of imperium are probably not due to faulty information or interpretations, but
because imperium was not a static concept.138 Even if we could pin down the specifics of a
dictator’s imperium, it would only represent a specific moment in time. Imperium gave power to
Rome’s top political figures, meaning it needed to change alongside the political system. Livy
described enactments of imperium, which allows us to consider the practical implications of the
dictator’s powers. A strict legalistic definition is not necessary, as Livy demonstrates that a
dictator’s effective power was ultimately supreme.
Scholars have created numerous arguments surrounding the dictator’s imperium. There is
particular controversy over Livy’s use of the term maius imperium, or greater imperium.139
Multiple scholars have taken Livy’s usage of maius imperium to indicate that early dictators had
a unique, uppermost grade of imperium.140 By this logic, early dictators actually had a higher
level of imperium than both consuls and third century BCE dictators.141 Alternatively, Brennan
argued that Livy’s claims of greater imperium are a misunderstanding.142 Brennan maintained
that a dictator and the consuls had equal imperium. He suggested that a dictatorship may even
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have suspended consular power, but both offices represented the equivalent levels of
imperium.143 Many scholars have reasoned that Livy (and other ancient historians) based the
legal abilities of early dictators on Sulla and Caesar, as these later dictators may have indeed
claimed higher imperium.144 Investigations of the dictator’s imperium are confused,
contradictory, and based on incomplete evidence. No official classification of a dictator’s
imperium has survived, if one ever existed at all. Instead of searching Livy’s narrative for
allusions to an unknowable legal code, it is far more useful to observe the actual ramifications of
the dictator’s power.
A speech in Livy from 325 BCE plainly stated, “the power of a dictator is supreme and
the consuls obey him, although theirs is the authority of kings, as do the praetors.”145 Clearly,
Livy believed that a dictator outranked a consul.146 Livy also mentioned at least two instances in
which a current consul was made dictator.147 This would have been entirely redundant if a consul
and a dictator were essentially equal, and even a hinderance if a dictator held lesser power. In
203 BCE, Livy recounted a dictator who ordered a consul to return to Italy, “on the strength of
his superior command.”148 It bears relevance that magistrates rarely “used imperium to check
imperium,” as challenging someone of comparable rank was dishonorable.149 Nonetheless, when
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necessary, a dictator could command the consuls. Livy’s account indicated that, if nothing else, a
dictator functionally outranked a consul.
Imperium also came with concrete trappings of power, which underscore the dictator’s
privileged position atop Rome’s power structure. Magistrates with imperium were accompanied
in public by lictors, who were guards that carried fasces (“bundles of rods with the executioner's
axe”).150 Along with purple robes, lictors were recycled royal symbols that signified a king’s full
imperium.151 Kings, and eventually consuls, had twelve lictors.152 Dictators had either twelve or
twenty-four lictors. The amount may have varied overtime, which reflects that the dictator’s
imperium perhaps fluctuated.153 The dictator’s lictors were his alone, unlike consuls, who shared
the guards in turns.154 The fasces were also decidedly symbolic, representing a magistrate’s
power to kill or use force against a citizen.155 Within the city, a consul’s fasces did not include
the axe.156 Distinguishing consular and regal imperium, this signified the people’s right to appeal
the judgement of a consul.157 Significantly, Livy wrote that a dictator’s fasces kept the
executioner’s axe in the city, which may signify that dictators were not subject to appeal.158

Gizewski, “Lictor”; see Livy 2. 29.
Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 246; Brennan, “Power and Process,” 37-39. Imperium was also expanded
to more magistrates, especially praetors, as Rome grew; for symbols of imperium from the regal period, see
Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 63. According to Mommsen, both originally symbolized the king’s power to
“exercise discipline and jurisdiction,”; Flower, “Spectacle and Political Culture.” 324-325.
152
Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 42.
153
Ancient sources do not agree, see Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 42-43; Many scholars
(especially in older works) list twenty-four, see Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 327; Niebuhr, The
History of Rome, Volume 1, 24, 553-554; North, “The Constitution of the Roman Republic,” 264.
154
In the early Republic, fasces were switched monthly, but daily exchanges were seen during the Second Punic
War, see Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 100; Livy 2. 1.
155
Armstrong, War and Society, 94-95, 167. As Armstrong described, violence towards fellow Romans had
limitations in the city, but imperium likely granted a commander the explicit “power of life or death over his
soldiers”; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 96-97; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 165-166.
Cornell described how this symbology may have been borrowed from Etruscan tradition.
156
This was not initially the case, but a very early consul passed a measure that removed the axe within the city, see
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 196.
157
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 226; Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 41.
158
Livy 2. 18. This was the first dictator, however, so it difficult to speculate about later practices; Bonner,
“Emergency Government,” 146.
150
151

28

Additionally, when a dictator was in office, the consuls’ lictors may have carried “dummy rods,”
suggesting consular power was inactive and subservient.159 This alternative set of fasces may
have been visibly different from those of the dictator, although the evidence surrounding dummy
rods is uncertain.160 Lictors were a tangible representation of imperium, so the use of dummy
rods for the consuls would seem to suggest the dictator’s supremacy. Therefore, both the
dictator’s actions and his symbology indicated that the office consistently overpowered the
consulship.
Importantly, any actual definition of imperium is temporally-bound, as the nature of
imperium was not fixed.161 Although this does not allow a precise taxonomy of a dictator’s
power, it makes sense in the context of the Republic’s perpetual changes. Power was constantly
redistributed and reorganized as Rome developed.162 In the early Republic, consuls may have
lost their imperium during a dictator’s term, which is reflected in Livy.163 He wrote that in 339
BCE, the Senate “wished to terminate the consul’s authority and ordered the appointment of a
dictator,” which implies that a dictatorship nullified consular imperium.164 During later years,
especially during the Second Punic War, it has been proposed that consuls may have remained in
power alongside a dictator.165 Rome had numerous armies fighting on multiple fronts, so this
would have been a sensible shift. In Livy, there is no mention of this change, although there were
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many strange uses of command power during the war.166 Nonetheless, Livy’s account of the
Second Punic War demonstrated dictators who held the top position.167 Livy wrote that in the
field, a consul had to “present himself to the dictator without his lictors” in 217 BCE.168 While
this does reveal any overt change in consular or dictatorial imperium, it may contradict the notion
that dictators held lesser power by this time.169 Although the dictator’s imperium probably
evolved overtime, Livy showed that the office still held substantial command power through the
third century BCE.
All things considered, any variations in the dictator’s imperium are hardly a revelation. If
we consider that a dictator’s superiority may have been functional rather than legal, any codified
difference scarcely reflects any meaningful change. Additionally, dictatorial appointments were
for a specific task. It is not a leap to assume that the dictator’s imperium varied case to case,
alongside changing informal expectations on the office. Even if a dictator did not technically
have more power than a consul, Livy presented dictators who unfailingly acted as the top
commander. Much of the scholarship tries to force the Republic into dogmatic legalistic terms,
even though the constitution was highly adaptable. Due to its reactive nature, the dictatorship
would have been especially subject to reinterpretation (or even experimentation).170 Livy
illustrated that dictators had considerable imperium and in practice outranked other magistrates.
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Beyond these two useful details, any exact classification of a dictator’s power is the result of a
historiographic attempt to portray an overly legalistic Roman Republic.
d. Circumstances for Appointment
Dictators were always appointed to handle a particular emergency or causa.171 Dictators
are frequently described only as military commanders, but this is an oversimplification. While
military appointments were the most common, especially in the early Republic, they only
represent forty-three of Livy’s sixty-seven dictators, or a little less than two-thirds of the total.172
Efficiency made the office versatile, leading dictators to be appointed for a variety of reasons
beyond waging war. While there was safety in the consulship’s collegiality, the decisive power
of an individual was often advantageous.173 Dictators were implemented to calm internal rioting,
hold elections, or to complete religious duties. The fasti, published lists of Rome’s magistrates,
noted a dictator’s reason for appointment with a particular label.174 These designations are often
used as the basis of scholarly discussions.175 This presents a problem, as the fasti do not give the
full story. Livy’s text narrates details that give a more comprehensive view of each appointment.
In his account, Rome regularly dealt with multiple concurrent emergencies. The label of a single
causa often fails to encapsulate the conditions that led to a dictator’s appointment. Livy also
described a wide variety of dictatorships, showing their importance outside the battlefield.
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Accordingly, our understanding of the dictatorship should look beyond famous military dictators.
A more inclusive approach reveals that appointing a dictator was an effective and streamlined
method for the state to handle a multitude of crises.176 By ignoring the complex circumstances
that surrounded appointments, the dictatorship’s flexibility and transformations are overlooked.
The fasti listed the specific causa for each dictator, which produced neat but inadequate
categories. The most common appointment was rei gerundae causa (which Marc de Wilde called
“literally, the ‘dictatorship for getting things done’”).177 This was a military dictatorship, usually
in response to a foreign threat. Generally, these dictators were appointed to lead war efforts after
a particularly devastating battle, rumors of enemies conspiring, or to complete an especially
arduous campaign. These dictators are the standard seen in reference works and most prominent
in Roman memory. Livy wrote about forty-seven dictators rei gerundae causa.178 The fasti
additionally labeled four of these dictators seditionis sedandae, which meant they were
specifically intended to handle domestic problems (de Wilde translated this as the “‘dictatorship
for suppressing civil insurrection’”).179 Internal crises were usually related to class conflict,
meaning this type of dictator was important during the Struggle of the Orders, (494 to 287
BCE).180 Some even argue that the dictatorship was created to address domestic disputes.181
Even if the office was not designed explicitly for rebellion, a dictator’s particular brand of power
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may have been suited to civil insurrections.182 The dictator was not subject to appeal, and may
have had the power to use force against citizens,183 which made him more useful than a consul
for domestic unrest.184 Even so, these labels fail to express the complexity of appointments. Livy
allows us to look at the actual situations in which a dictator was appointed, rather than just the
assigned causa.
Although only four of Livy’s dictators were formally appointed to handle insurrection
(seditionis sedandae), I find at least ten instances when class warfare was a key factor, all
notably falling before 330 BCE.185 By this time, plebeians had attained admission to offices and
various legal reform.186 Also of note are the four successive dictators who were appointed (at
least in part) because of class conflicts during the pivotal years of 385-368 BCE.187 The
impactful Licinio-Sextian laws (lex Licinia Sextia ) were passed from 367-366 BCE. This set of
reforms gave plebeians access to one of the consular positions, capped public land holdings
(which was largely a restriction on the elite), and provided plebeian debt relief.188 Naturally, the
aristocracy attempted to maintain control through dictators.189 In some cases, a dictator’s official
task appeared to act as a pretext. Livy described a scenario in 494 BCE, in which a dictator was
technically meant to lead war, but “the commons were well aware that the appointment of a
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dictator was directed against themselves.”190 Again in 385 BCE, a dictator was appointed for
“serious foreign war and an even more serious internal resurrection.”191 Officially, this dictator
was portrayed as a military response. Yet, Livy wrote that the appointment, “was not aimed at
the Volscians, who were enemies only when it suited the patricians.”192 Both of these dictators
are recorded exclusively as rei gerundae causa in the fasti.193
Livy also provided many illustrations of the complicated circumstances that surrounded
appointments. In a representative example, Livy’s first dictator appears in the fasti as rei
gerundae causa. Despite being categorized as a military assignment, Titus Lartius was appointed
in 501 BCE in response to a combination of threats.194 In Livy’s version of the story, “mounting
anxiety and tension” were overwhelming Rome.195 Conflict with the neighboring Sabines196
looked imminent, and there was a threat of a league of Latin settlements banding together against
Rome.197 Internally, there was a skirmish between young Sabine men during the Games,198
which escalated and drew a crowd.199 There were also rumors of Roman officials discussing
“sympathies” for the Tarquins.200 In this increasingly tense climate, Titus Lartius was appointed
dictator.201 He proved to be effective at handling both varieties of conflict.
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According to Livy, citizens had “a more docile frame of mind” simply from seeing the
dictator in the city.202 The Sabines were so alarmed by the appointment of a dictator that they
immediately made efforts to avoid war.203 This dictator did not even have to enter the battlefield
to resolve a variety of issues. As Livy presented it, the mere act of appointing a dictator was
enough to comfort Romans and frighten enemies.204 Despite his military assignment, the dictator
had considerable influence over domestic affairs. Strict labeling muddles the actual purpose of
the dictatorship, which was to provide an efficient response to an emergency situation. Dictators
were appointed when Rome was reaching a crisis point, often due to multiple internal and
external concerns. Furthermore, dictators rei gerundae clearly handled many different tasks, both
military and civil.
The remaining categories of dictator are less often discussed. Nonetheless, these dictators
add to our understanding of the institution. Apart from acting as a military commander or
suppressing unrest, the dictator also managed religious emergencies. Even a dictator rei
gerundae causa was expected to complete religious responsibilities, which further underlines the
challenge of categorizing dictators. Three appointments appear to be specifically for religious
crises, although religious fears and ritual were a part of all dictatorships (and all Roman
government).205 One of these dictators was appointed to hold a public holiday (feriarum
constituendarum causa), while the other two carried out a highly debated practice.206 These two
men were appointed to complete an obscure religious ceremony, in which a dictator (clavi
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figendi causa)207 nailed a hammer into a board to prevent plague.208 Even Livy’s initial
description of this ritual is peculiar.
In 363 BCE, Rome was being ravaged by plague, and it seemed the gods were ignoring
pleas for mercy.209 Apparently, older members of the community recalled, “at one time an
outbreak of plague had been reduced by the dictator’s hammering in a nail.”210 The Senate took
to this idea, and Lucius Manlius Imperious was named to complete the ritual.211 In a bizarre turn
of events, Manlius failed to actually hammer the nail. He decided to ignore the reason for his
appointment. Instead, Manlius “set his heart on war with the Hernici,” but the Senate forced him
to resign before he accomplished anything.212 Manlius’s dictatorship raises questions about the
types of dictators. While it appears from his attempt that a dictator that was appointed for a
different task still had the imperium to conduct war, the backlash to his actions imply some sort
of restrictions on his power.
Despite Manlius’s botched attempt, a dictator was appointed for the hammering ritual
once again in 332 BCE. Livy wrote that the Romans remembered Manlius’s ceremony, which
inexplicably had helped restore “self-control” during a class conflict.213 Despite Livy’s
contradictory information, this later dictator completed the ceremony.214 Livy also mentioned a
dictator carrying out this ritual in 313 BCE.215 The dictators who completed this unusual
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ceremony bear little resemblance to well-known military dictators, which demonstrates the need
to expand discussions of the dictatorship. Moreover, the dictator commonly had religious
obligations—often tangential to his military or other tasks—like holding Games, dedicating
temples, or overseeing additional rituals.216 Although dictators were seldom appointed explicitly
for these rituals, completing religious duties was an important aspect of the position.217
Lastly, dictators were also appointed to conduct elections (comitiorum habendorum
causa).218 These appointments are often ignored in discussions, likely because they were
relatively mundane. Yet, electoral dictators prove the office’s versatility. While not a
catastrophic emergency, dictators held elections when a consul was unavailable. Dictators were a
useful solution when consuls were ill, incapacitated, or else unable to return to Rome while
leading combat.219 This administrative role became more and more common overtime. Many
earlier dictators were war heroes, but their third century BCE counterparts were frequently
trusted civil servants.220 Livy wrote about seventeen dictators appointed for elections.221 This
mode of dictatorship may have been comparatively dull, but the office was still filling a vital
role. As Rome expanded, consuls were involved with wars that were much farther away,
meaning it was increasingly problematic to recall them for elections.222

216

Games: Livy 6. 42, 7. 11, 8. 40, 22. 9, 27. 35; dedications: Livy 5. 20; 6. 29; 10.1, 22. 9; rituals: Livy 6. 12, 22. 9.
There are more examples for each, but these show a variety throughout.
217
Especially as dictators were often appointed amidst religious anxieties. Notably, Camillus’s dictatorships often
had an ethos of restoring piety, see especially, Livy 5. 19-23.
218
Drogula, Commanders & Command, 169.
219
Ill consuls: Livy 7. 24-7. 25; consuls in the field: Livy 7. 26, 8. 16, 8. 23 (although this dictator resigned before
elections); new offices like the praetorship also helped to fill extra command positions, see Brennan, “Power and
Process,” 38-40.
220
Drogula, Commanders & Command, 178.
221
I am also including Marcus Fabius Buteo in this count, although he was not comitiorum habendorum causa, but
senatus legendi causa, as he was uniquely appointed to elect senators during the Second Punic War, see Livy 23. 2223.
222
Livy 22. 8. See the example of Quintus Fabius in Chapter III-g “Magister Equitum”

37

Before the Second Punic War, Livy reported only eight of fifty-six dictators appointed for
elections (one-seventh). During the war, this ratio changed dramatically. From 217 to 201 BCE,
Livy listed only eleven dictators total. Again, eight of these dictators were meant to hold
elections, but they represented nearly three-quarters of appointments during the Second Punic
War (Table 1). 223 The timeline makes sense, as Rome and its consuls were engaged in larger
conflicts during this time.224 Appointing an electoral dictator allowed normal election cycles to
continue even during longer campaigns. Rome no longer needed dictators to conduct war, but
instead implemented the office to keep government running smoothly. The dictator had become
more useful as a reserve administrator than a temporary general. These dictators were not
directly leading war but were nonetheless essential to Rome’s success.
Military dictators were admittedly the most common, and surely the most famous. Even
so, the variety of dictators reflected the Republic’s flexibility. The Romans continually adapted
the dictatorship to suit a shifting assortment of emergencies, responsive to the Republic’s
constantly changing needs. As Livy’s history indicated, the circumstances surrounding a
dictator’s appointment were rarely straightforward. By definition, dictators were appointed amid
emergencies, which are inherently disordered. In order to truly understand the dictator’s role, it is
necessary not only to look at the full scope of dictators, but also how power was enacted outside
their specific task. In short, the Roman dictatorship was a flexible office that filled an assortment
of formal and informal roles, which led to (or least allowed for) the institution’s continual
evolution throughout the Republic’s development.
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Table 1: Livy's Dictators by Type225

Total Dictators:
Elections:
(comitiorum habendorum causa,
senatus legendi causa)

Military:

217-201 BCE
501-301 BCE

(Second Punic War)

56

11

8 (14 %)

8 (73 %)

41 (73 %)

2 (18 %)

7 (13 %)

1 (9 %)

(Rei gerundae causa)

Other:
(clavi figendi causa, feriarum
constituendarum causa, seditionis
sedandae et rei gerundae causa,
interregni causa)

e. The Appointment Process
Despite the urgency of many dictatorships, the process of appointment was formalized
and rarely deviated from convention. The general procedure appears fairly consistent throughout
Livy. Only a consul could nominate a dictator.226 Livy wrote that appointments by consul were,
“a solemn tradition, backed by religious sanctions.”227 The Senate could not officially challenge a
consul’s choice of dictator. Yet even without legal authority, the Senate appeared to be involved
in virtually all dictatorial appointments. The Senate frequently went to great lengths to compel an
appointment, but the decision ultimately rested with a consul. In later dictatorships, there were a
few notable exceptions. As with many aspects of the dictatorship, a closer investigation of the
appointment process can demonstrate gaps in scholarly discourse. Although Livy reaffirmed—on
multiple occasions—that only a consul could appoint a dictator, his narrative often showed the
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Senate’s extensive influence.228 Particularly in older scholarship, the dynamics of informal
powers are largely disregarded, as they operated outside the known legal code.229 The process of
appointing dictators clearly demonstrated the key political roles of tradition, expectation, and
power relationships, which were not adequately expressed in any official law.230 As Lintott aptly
described, Rome’s “flexible conceptualization of the constitution” allowed the Republic to adapt
by continually shifting the balance of power “between Senate, People, and magistrates.”231
Livy’s text revealed informal pressures and peculiarities in appointment practices, which can
exhibit these continual negotiations of control.
In 353 BCE, Livy wrote that the Senate “ordered” the consul Marcus Valerius Publicola
out of the field to appoint a dictator. Valerius was in Tusculum, just over fifteen miles (a day’s
journey) from Rome.232 Throughout Livy’s account, this was normal practice. When the Senate
wanted a dictator, consuls were obliged to return to Rome. Dictators also had to be appointed
within Italy, which became progressively more inconvenient.233 As Rome became engaged in
more warfare, farther from the city, it was often difficult to contact consuls.234 Yet, the Senate
still summoned consuls from the field to appoint dictators. The process was honored even when
inconvenient, showing adherence to tradition.235 Even still, Livy plainly showed the Senate
pulling the strings. The initial decision to name a dictator usually originated in the Senate.
Phrases appear in Livy like, “the Senate lost no time in ordering the appointment of a dictator,”
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or “the Senate decided to appoint a dictator,” which reaffirm senatorial influence.236 In 310 BCE,
the Senate selected a dictator with whom a consul had a “personal grudge.”237 The Senate
arranged an envoy to convince the consul. He succumbed but was not pleased. The consul “kept
his eyes on the ground and retired without a word,” and continued to be insolently silent the next
day in order to display his “strong resentment.”238 In practice, a consular appointment often
seemed to be a formality.
Livy also wrote about instances in which a consul was actively against the nomination of
a dictator, but was ostensibly forced by the Senate. In 431 BCE, multiple enemies were preparing
for war, an aggressive epidemic was worsening, and tensions were high between the year’s
consuls. The tumultuous state of affairs alarmed the Senate and they accordingly called for a
dictator.239 Inopportunely, the argumentative consuls could only agree on one idea, “their
opposition to the Senate over the appointment of a Dictator.”240 Despite the rare allegiance of the
adversarial consuls, their decision was challenged. A group of consular tribunes saw this as “an
opportunity of increasing their power,” and decreed a “unanimous resolution,” which threatened
to imprison the consuls if they defied the Senate’s will.241 The consuls decided it was “less
unpleasant” to succumb to the tribunes, and they disgruntledly appointed a dictator.242 In this
case, there was an interesting negotiation of political power. Consular tribunes certainly had an
amount of influence over the consuls, but it appears that it took the intimidation of both the
Senate and the tribunes to force the appointment. Also notable is that the consuls preferred to
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obey the tribunes over the Senate, which underlines the interesting role of informal precedents
and power dynamics.
The Senate did not only demand appointments, but they were also concerned with a
consul’s choice of dictator. The first plebeian dictator, Gaius Marcius Rutulus, was nominated in
357 BCE in response to a military threat.243 While the circumstances of appointment were
familiar, the choice of a plebeian was unprecedented. Livy remarked that the elite “thought it
outrageous that even the dictatorship should now be open to all” and tried to block “any decision
or preparation.” The exact opposing patrician group is unclear, although Livy seemed to refer to
the Senate. He wrote that “the people” rallied behind the dictator, “all the readier to vote for
everything the dictator proposed.”244 Gaius was very successful in battle, and “was granted a
triumph by the people…without Senate authorization.”245 In this case, it is evident that the
Senate could not legally override a consul’s choice of dictator. They could, however, resist
appointments and make action difficult. Visibly, the Senate had substantial influence, even
outside of their lawful authority.246 Also important was the people’s embrace of Gaius Marcius.
The dictator still received enough support to be effective. He was even able to win an unofficial
triumph, showing an assertion of the people’s power. In just this one instance, Livy displayed the
fluctuating relationship between the Senate, people, and the consuls. Clearly, appointments could
involve an elaborate negotiation process outside the letter of the law.
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I find only three cases in Livy of dictators who were appointed without a consul.247 All
were especially unusual circumstances. In 426 BCE, consular tribunes chose a dictator. This was
during the notoriously confusing period in which consular tribunes allegedly held office instead
of consuls.248 The appointment was sanctioned by both the people and augurs.249 A consul did
not appoint this dictator, but the consular power did.250 There was a more notable exception to
tradition in 217 BCE, during the thick of the Second Punic War. Both consuls were heavily
engaged in hard battles, so deep in enemy territory that the Senate was not even able to send a
letter.251 Although Livy reiterated that a consul had the sole power to appoint a dictator, in an
“unprecedented step” the people (with the strong consent of the Senate) appointed Quintus
Fabius Maximus as “acting-dictator.”252
In this strange incident, Livy suggested that a consul’s appointment was used in all prior
dictatorships.253 Notably, this dictator was still branded as “acting,” because he lacked the proper
consular authorization. Fabius also dealt with unparalleled insurrection from his master of horse,
which perhaps emphasized the importance of the sacred process.254 Without proper adherence to
tradition, Fabius was only “acting” and received considerably less respect.255 In this context,
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Fabius’s appointment was representative of the Republic’s larger developments. The people’s
will had more impact, enough that they were able to essentially mimic a consul’s power. The
Senate’s influence had also grown, allowing them to respond to the Second Punic War’s nearconstant influx of disasters.256 The next year, amid utter chaos and heavy casualties, Livy
reported that a dictator was appointed “on the Senate’s authority” to hold widespread
conscription.257 These discrepancies in the dictator’s protected selection process clearly
paralleled larger developments in the Republic’s power structure.
While dictators were legally appointed by consul, Livy illustrated that this legality must
be understood in the context of the Senate’s extraordinary impact, the growing voice of citizens,
and an array of other informal influences. The Republic was in an endless process of reshaping
and amending its unwritten constitution. Tradition was important, but so was practicality and
responsiveness. The case of the “acting-dictator” expressed this philosophy towards breaking
custom.258 If Rome had strictly adhered to its legal code, the state may have suffered a damaging
military defeat. Instead, the Romans chose to adapt. By granting the dictator provisional status,
they were able to respect tradition while still taking practical action. Although the appointment
may have been theoretically illegal, there was an informal precedent for the Senate’s
appointment of dictators. The decision also reflected the political shifts which were progressively
empowering both the Senate and the populace. As a result, Livy demonstrated the value of
looking beyond official law code when examining both the dictatorship and the Republic.
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f. Ceremony and the Auspices
Once appointed, a dictator acquired auspicium through an obscure ceremony.259 In
essence, auspicium was the ability to commune with the gods and interpret their signals.260
Dictators held auspicia maxima, the highest level of religious authority.261 It was vital for
magistrates to possess auspicium, as consulting the auspices was a key government function. For
dictators (as well as other magistrates), errors or faults in the auspices occurred often, meaning
the dictator was required to return to Rome and repeat the ceremony, or else resign. Scholars
often write that the dictator’s deep ties to auspicium lent the office its “sacral” qualities that may
have helped preserve it overtime.262 A guise of piety, however, was also an effective way to
challenge a dictator. The interpretation of the auspices was highly sensitive, which made it easy
to exploit. As a result, the dictator’s auspices were a way to circumvent his untouchable status.
Even if he did not resign, a dictator’s progress could be stalled by a return to Rome. In the early
Republic, patricians alone were able to possess auspicium, a major cause of class conflict.263
Roman religion was controlled by the elite, even as political offices and other public functions
became more inclusive.264 The aristocracy carefully protected the auspices, which helped to stifle
plebeian access to the most powerful offices. Livy described many incidents involving improper
auspices, which allows us to observe aristocratic attempts to retain control of the dictatorship.
Auspication was the practice of watching birds, examining entrails, observing natural
signs, or consulting other divine prophecies before a decision or event.265 While auspices were
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consulted as part of the political process, their true purpose was not prediction, but to calm
religious fears with ancient tradition.266 Interpreting proper auspices, or favorable omens, was
essential for actions like the confirmation of magistrates and beginning battles.267 Although Livy
mentioned the dictator’s auspices often, he gave little detail about the appointment ceremony.
The ritual was sacred, secretive, and exceedingly sensitive. According to Livy, the ceremony
involved a consul, who appointed the dictator, “in the silence of night, as custom is.”268 Then, the
consul would listen, in silence, for a sound of disapproval from the gods. Quiet was taken as
divine approval for the dictator to take the auspices.269 This appears to be the standard process, as
in another case, Livy wrote that a “consul had risen in the night and made the appointment in
silence.”270 The dictatorship’s enigmatic ceremony was uniquely strange, as other appointments
were not handled this way.271 Livy’s descriptions were sporadic and vague, but this secrecy
protected the ceremony and auspicium. The details of the odd ritual are obscure to us, but this
may be because it was also mysterious to most Romans, even within politics.
The ceremony’s elusiveness and fragility were likely deliberate. The sensitivity of the
ritual was perhaps the only formal method to undermine a dictator’s power. Livy wrote about
nearly constant issues with the auspices, including six cases that led to a dictator’s resignation.272
Superficially, detecting a fault in the auspices was an act of piety. The ceremony was redone for
various ambiguous reasons, such as a “sinister omen,” or “religious doubts.” 273 More
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realistically, most accusations of improper auspices were politically motivated.274 Any mistakes
in the auspices were taken very seriously, and thus challenging a dictator’s auspicium was an
effective tactic. In 302 BCE, the dictator Marcus Valerius Maximus returned to the city to retake
the auspices, which left his magister equitum to be “ambushed” and lose several men.275 A
similar situation occurred during the Second Punic War, when dictators were operating much
farther from Rome.276 Plainly, an accusation against the dictator’s auspices required a return to
Rome, even when it exposed his army to considerable risk.
Secretive practices made the auspices esoteric, and thus the ritual could be exploited by
the aristocracy. Even as plebeians gained access to power, the patricians were still able to
manipulate the dictator’s appointment process. As the highest offices were expected to have
auspicium, this allowed the elite to exert control over the top religious roles and political
positions.277 Livy included multiple examples of the aristocracy’s attempts to guard the auspices.
After a plebeian consul was killed in a disastrous battle, patricians cried that it was divine
punishment for giving the “auspices to those for whom it was a sin to take them!”278 A patrician
from the old-elite Claudius family was made dictator to remedy this religious problem,
underlining the aristocratic protection of the auspices. As dictators held the maximum level of
auspicium,279 the elite’s religious supremacy also helps to explain why the office was dominated
by aristocratic men.
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Even when the top offices opened to plebeians, the auspices were used to repress
plebeian progress. In 327 BCE, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, a plebeian, was appointed dictator
for the purpose of holding elections.280 Soon after, an inquiry was held into his auspicium and
appointment, which were deemed “irregular.”281 Livy did not reveal the specific source of the
concerns. It can, however, be assumed the question originated in the Senate or established
aristocracy, as plebeian tribunes fought the accusation. They argued that a “flaw could not have
been easily detected,” due to the secrecy of the ceremony, meaning it was truly an excuse to oust
a plebeian dictator.282 These allegations were not unrealistic, as Marcellus was only the third
plebeian to take the position. The accusations were upheld, and the dictator resigned. As a result,
elections were not held. Rather than repeating the auspices or appointing a new dictator, Rome
went into an interregnum.283 An interregnum was a pause in the normal functioning of
government. It was instated when no magistrates were in office, due to the expiration of their
term, or a resignation.
In Livy, only seven dictators were compelled to resign before completing their term or
task.284 Six out of these seven dictators were pushed out due to religious concerns or flaws in
their elections.285 Conspicuously, four of these dictatorships resulted in an interregnum.286
During an interregnum, a string of single patrician senators would serve as interrex for five days,
passing imperium and auspicium until normal functioning was restored.287 Reverting to an
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interregnum was a way for the aristocrats to temporarily take control of Rome, although an
interrex was not as powerful as a dictator or consul.288 While interregnums were purportedly to
maintain government between elections, Livy’s narrative showed them to be much closer to
aristocratic power grabs. Naturally, interregnums were common during the height of the Struggle
of the Orders. Between 338 and 321 BCE, there were three cases in which Rome fell to an
interregnum after the resignation of a dictator.289 In 321 BCE, two dictators in a row were ousted
due to issues with the auspices.290 This surely represented the aristocracy attempting to maintain
control of Rome, especially as the period between 356 and 300 BCE saw the opening of virtually
all offices to plebeians.291
So, the obscure details of the dictator’s appointment process are less important than the
ritual’s role in Republican politics. The ceremony was a relic of old aristocracy and ancient
religion, and therefore mysterious. While the dictatorship was flexible, the procedure was not.
Religion was deeply tied to the dictatorship, as Livy underlined with statements such as, “the
order of a dictator, which has always been revered as the gods’ will.”292 Consequently,
auspicium was essential to the dictatorship’s power, making adherence to the process crucial. As
plebeians encroached on elite supremacy, the fragility and necessity of the ceremony was
weaponized. By regulating knowledge and control of religion, the aristocracy was able to exploit
ritual in order to maintain control of the dictatorship.

Brennan, “Power and Process,” 64;
Livy 8. 17, 8. 23, 9. 7. Again, a string of two resigning dictators in 321 BCE. In this instance, I am treating them
as one “case,” although they were separate dictatorships.
290
Livy 9. 7.
291
Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 18.
292
Livy 8. 34.
288
289

49

g. Magister Equitum
After being appointed, the dictator chose a master of horse, or magister equitum, to serve
as his second-in-command.293 Information about the dictatorship is inconsistent, and details
about his magister equitum are even scarcer. It is largely accepted that the position stemmed
from an ancient rule that forbid a dictator to ride on horseback.294 So, masters of horse were
customarily in charge of the cavalry, while the dictator lead the infantry.295 Livy stated that a
master of horse’s “power is equivalent to a consul’s.”296 This may have been true at some point,
but the powers of the magister equitum may have changed alongside the dictatorship.297 Perhaps
more notably, the dynamic between dictator and master of horse changed from the early
Republic. Almost universally, early masters of horse seem to have acted as obedient second
commanders. Some pairs exhibited extraordinary loyalty, like Cincinnatus’s master of horse,
who killed an accused conspirator because he declined to appear in front of the dictator.298
Cincinnatus then fervently defended his magister equitum from angered citizens.299 Later in the
Republic, masters of horse were less subservient. While it is easy to observe variations in the
frequency of dictatorships or their causa, the subtleties of this relationship can only be seen in a
narrative text like Livy. He often recounted interactions between the dictator and the master of
horse, especially in the field. The shifting dynamic between the two commanders may be
representative of the dictator’s changed role during the Second Punic War. The dictator’s official
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imperium may have been consistent, but diminished respect from his second-in-command can
nonetheless reveal the dictator’s altered role within the Republic.
The harmony between early dictators and masters of horse may simply be attributed to
choice. Before 358 BCE, Livy said (or implied) that a dictator chose his master of horse.300 The
dictator generally selected an obvious ally, or even a son.301 Beginning in 358 BCE, many
masters of horse were “given” to a dictator, usually by the Senate.302 Unfortunately, Livy gave
no explanation for this change. The shift may mark a modification of the dictator’s power, the
Senate’s influence, or else a redefinition of the master of horse. Ten years prior, Publius Manlius
was the first dictator to choose a plebeian as his magister equitum. This openly “annoyed the
patricians” but Publius claimed a “close relationship” with his appointee.303 The dictator’s choice
escalated to a full-blown class conflict, which resulted in heated debates that completely
overshadowed any of Publius’s actions while in power.304 Only two years later, in 356 BCE, the
first plebeian dictator took office. The timeline is damning, as during the class conflicts in 352 to
345 BCE there were six dictators, four of whom Livy explicitly stated were “given” their master
of horse.305 About a decade after the start of the Licinio-Sextian laws,306 this was a pivotal time
for the Struggle of the Orders. For the first time, it seemed all offices were opening to plebeians.
So, it is imaginable that the transition to a “given” master of horse was an attempt to protect the
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elite hold on the entire institution of the dictatorship. The theory is not watertight, as many of
these dictators were still (to some extent) aligned with the aristocracy. Nonetheless, the change
displayed that the dictator’s role was fluctuating.
In addition, the master of horse’s role may have evolved. A magister equitum never won
a triumph, which may indicate they could not possess imperium or auspicium.307 Some sources
seem to indicate that a magister equitum was attended by six lictors, half of a dictator’s, but a
magister equitum is not reported with lictors until the late Republic.308 The late appearance of
lictors aligns with the theory that masters of horse were granted imperium at some point. It is
also noteworthy that command power was expanded to more men during the difficult years of
the Second Punic War.309 By this time, masters of horse may have possessed imperium minus, a
lesser degree of power.310 It makes sense that in the era of increased warfare, having an extra
commander with imperium would have been prudent. Perhaps this also helps to explain why
masters of horse were assigned to dictators.311 If masters of horse came to possess imperium (or
were even equal to a consul, as Livy suggested) this meant the magister equitum would have
been a more protected office. Perhaps allowing a dictator to choose an assistant with imperium
was too risky, or else assigning a magister equitum was a new check to a dictator’s power.
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As time went on, not all masters of horse were content to act as lieutenant. If masters of
horse were indeed given imperium, the evolution is reasonable. A more powerful master of horse
would have been less likely to yield to a dictator. Regardless of the cause, Livy exhibited a
demonstrable change in the master of horse’s behavior. In 325 BCE, Rome was engaged in war
against the Samnites. The consul overseeing the conflict fell ill, which led to the appointment of
the dictator Lucius Papirius Cursor.312 Papirius picked his own magister equitum, Quintus Fabius
Maximus Rullianus. As the men were nearing Samnium, a flaw in the auspices was found by
“the keeper of the sacred chickens.”313 As was customary, this was taken very seriously. Papirius
quickly returned to Rome to properly retake the auspices. The dictator forbade the army and
Quintus Fabius to take any action until he returned.314 While Papirius was in Rome, scouts
reported that the Samnites were unprepared for attack.315 The young master of horse decided to
defy the dictator’s orders and seized the opportunity to strike. Livy described Quintus Fabius as
either hungry for glory or “fired with indignation that all initiative should apparently be in the
hands of the dictator.”316 Despite his disobedience, Fabius’s ambush led to a successful battle,
which—according to Livy—cost the Samnites some twenty-thousand casualties.317
Successes aside, the master of horse had defied Rome’s supreme commander. Papirius
further tried to safeguard his win by sending word of the success directly to the Senate (and not
his commander). Papirius was furious with the insurrection. He even called for Quintus Fabius’s
execution, which seems to have been within the dictator’s rights.318 Papirius declared that the
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defiance had undermined the sacred power of the dictator.319 He felt the precedent would be
harmful to the institution. The two men engaged in a ferociously jealous fight for credit. Quintus
Fabius seemed to be afraid of the dictator’s wrath. He assembled soldiers to support his assertion
that he “had conducted himself as master of Horse and not as the dictator’s orderly!”320
Nonetheless, the incident was used as an opportunity to reinforce the dictator’s power. Papirius
gave a speech emphasizing that he left for religious reasons, meaning Quintus Fabius had
violated both “our fathers’ teaching and the gods’ divine power.”321 Papirius inflated the entire
incident, declaring that in blocking his punishment of Quintus Fabius, the tribunes would
“destroy the lawful effectiveness of the dictatorship.”322 The conflict ended unspectacularly, as
Papirius granted mercy because the people begged for it.323
In the end, Papirius may have been correct about the incident’s adverse precedent. During
the Second Punic War, a defiant magister equitum managed to be promoted to co-dictator for a
short time.324 The “acting-dictator” Quintus Fabius Maximus was strategically delaying the
army’s approach to Hannibal’s men. Master of horse Minucius grew tired of Fabius’s stalling
and tried to turn the troops against him. The master of horse invoked “Camillus, that true
Roman,” as an example of decisive action.325 Inopportunely, Fabius was summoned back to the
city “to attend to certain religious matters” and urged Minucius to proceed cautiously and to
continue the tactical delays.326 The magister equitum did not listen and led a battle in the
dictator’s absence with “some success.” Minucius sent “a letter full of braggadocio” back to

319

Livy 8. 30.
Livy 8. 31.
321
Livy 8. 32.
322
Livy 8. 34
323
Livy 8. 35. Perhaps notable, as dictators did not customarily submit to the will of the masses.
324
Livy 22. 25-26.
325
Livy 22. 14.
326
Livy 22. 18.
320

54

Rome after the modest victory.327 Then, the government also began to turn on Fabius. A plebeian
tribune declared that Fabius had delayed in the field in order to extend his dictatorship.328
Enraged, the tribune asked “that power be shared equally between the dictator and the master of
Horse.”329 Despite Fabius’s protests that Minucius had acted recklessly, the decree was
accepted.330 The contention became even more apparent as the two co-dictators worked together
in the field. Minucius was thrilled by the “equalization,” feeling encouraged that he had broken
the pattern “where mere masters of Horse had been in the habit of cringing like curs before the
dictator’s terrible rods and axes.”331
Increased power for the master of horse or decreased reverence for the dictatorship may
have instigated the newfound defiance. Granted, cases of insubordination come from Livy’s later
work, which contains generally more accurate information (or else it was harder for Livy to
fabricate stories).332 The early Republic was highly romanticized in the record, meaning
insubordinate masters of horse may have been glossed over. Nonetheless, increasingly insolent
masters of horse may have reflected shifts in power. Precedents like Quintus Fabius showed that
as the Republic progressed, dictators were not as untouchable as they once were. The office’s
adaptability made it useful, but perhaps not all changes strengthened the position. The
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aristocracy and top magistrates were increasingly subject to both the will of the Senate and the
people. Despite the dictatorship’s privileged status, the institution was not immune to the
growing impact of popular sovereignty.
h. Leaving Office
After completing his service, a dictator was meant to step down immediately and relinquish
his power. Scholars almost unanimously agree that a dictatorship was limited to six months.333
This was the typical length of a campaigning season, at least in the early Republic.334 In general,
six months was not a term length as much as a maximum limit. Once he had accomplished his
task, an honorable dictator would resign. Almost every dictator obeyed the six-month term, if
they did not step down even sooner.335 Livy confirmed a six-month term,336 although he wrote
that many glorified early dictators resigned after only days or weeks. Debates surrounding the
term limit usually discuss whether a dictator’s term was tied to the consul who appointed him, or
else the possibility of sporadic year-long terms.337 In the end, these inquiries were not only
inconclusive, but are also largely inconsequential. The term limit itself was not as revealing as
the intricacies of resignations. Harris argued that term limits were a way for Rome to continue its
delusion of democracy.338 In turn, perhaps resigning was a means for the ruling classes to create
the allusion of yielding to the people or the Senate. Relinquishing your office exhibited restraint,
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which was an essential component of fides.339 In order to maintain Rome’s political system,
magistrates had to (or at least appear to) check their individual ambition. Restraint is particularly
pertinent to the dictatorship, which was effectively the most power a single Roman could hold.
The “self-restraint of the ancients” is one of Livy’s key lessons to readers.340 He wrote often
about resignations, both enthusiastic and forced. As a result, we are able to track a variety of
resignation scenarios, which in turn demonstrated the dictatorship’s fluctuating relationship to
the people and the Senate.
In the early Republic, most of Livy’s dictators accomplished their tasks quickly and
decisively. A famous example is Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, who resigned after just fifteen
days in 458 BCE. He was appointed in response to the Aequian’s brazen violation of a recent
peace treaty. They had sacked several Roman towns and a consul’s military encampment.341
News of the attacks caused widespread panic in Rome. In the words of Livy, “the situation
evidently called for a dictator,”342 Cincinnatus was in exile on the outskirts of Rome, working
diligently on his farm, “digging a ditch, maybe, or ploughing.”343 Soon, an envoy reached the
farm and asked him to take supreme command. Cincinnatus simply brushed the sweat from his
brow and asked his wife to bring his toga.344 The newly-appointed dictator arrived in the city by
morning. Cincinnatus promptly took command and prepared the populace for war. Within days,
he led his soldiers into combat.345 Just over two weeks after being summoned from his farm,
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Cincinnatus achieved victory, took the spoils, and resigned his dictatorship.346 While this story is
closer to myth than historical reality, Cincinnatus nonetheless serves as a fair archetype for the
expectations of a Roman dictator.347 An ideal appointee was meant to wield their power in
service of the state, and surrender their office as soon as possible.
Livy told a myriad of similar stories in order to emphasize dictators’ restraint. In 418
BCE, Livy wrote that Quintus Servilius Priscus achieved a great military victory and resigned
after a term of one week.348 Later, there was Titus Quintus Cincinnatus, who resigned after just
twenty days in 380 BCE. The simple news of his appointment was enough to unite Rome’s
distraught plebeians and terrify the enemy.349 Livy told us that Mamercus Aemilius’s third
dictatorship lasted just sixteen days, also providing him a military triumph.350 These stories were
likely exaggerated but stressed the symbolic weight of the term limit. A dictator who quickly
relinquished his power showed respect for the Republic and the institution. Republican politics
were built on the idea that officials had an obligation to practice self-control and behave
moderately.351 Especially in the early Republic, this helped the aristocracy to protect its
supremacy. Honorable dictators continually expressed moderation, which made their substantial
power easier to swallow. There are echoes of this in Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus’s famous story.
When the dictator first entered the city, Livy described ordinary citizens, who gathered in wary
crowds, “by no means so pleased to see the new dictator, as they thought his power excessive
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and dreaded the way in which he was likely to use it.”352 By the end of his dictatorship, Livy
portrayed Cincinnatus as unanimously adored.353 Emblematic exhibitions of restraint
manipulated plebeians to accept the aristocratic status quo, at least temporarily.
Resigning in protest served a similar function.354 In 434 BCE, Livy described Mamercus
Aemilius’s second dictatorship. After an unproductive military effort, Mamercus decided to use
his remaining term for domestic improvements.355 Reinforcing the dictator’s commitment to
restraint, he rallied against the five-year term of censors.356 The dictator found the long term to
be unjust, as “the greatest safeguard” of the Republic, was “that great powers should never
remain long in the same hands.”357 His proposal to shrink the term to a year and a half was
extremely popular with the populace and easily passed. Upon completion of the vote, Mamercus
immediately resigned as a mark of his “‘disapproval of the extended tenure of power.’”358 Livy
clearly showed a dictator who used his power to reaffirm Republican principles. Similarly, in
494 BCE, a dictator resigned after the Senate refused to amend its policy on plebeian debt, which
naturally won the dictator approval from the commons.359 Resignations were a convenient
technique to bolster the dictatorship’s reputation among the people. In the case of these protest
resignations, the dictators may have ironically strengthened their individual reputation, even at
the expense of the Senate.

352

Livy 3. 27.
Livy 3. 29.
354
I only find two examples, which makes this type of resignation uncommon but emblematic (see below).
355
Livy 4. 24.
356
Brennan, “Power and Process,” 65; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 116. Censors were usually
former consuls with auspicia, they held the census of both property and citizen, as well as a subsequent ritual.
357
Livy 4. 34.
358
Livy 4. 23-24. Censors were understandably upset about this, but Mamercus handled the ridicule calmly.
359
Livy 2. 30-31.
353

59

Nonetheless, not all dictators eagerly laid down their office. Livy included seven dictators
who were forced to resign.360 It seems that a dictator could not be legally fired or truly obligated
to leave office. He could, however, be strongly compelled to do so, especially by the Senate. As
discussed, Livy wrote of six resignations due to faults in the auspices.361 These can be interpreted
as either voluntary or compulsory. The remaining resignation was much closer to a dismissal. An
odd appointment from the start, this dictator was Lucius Manlius, the disgraced dictator who was
appointed for the nail ceremony in 363 BCE. He ignored his assigned religious task to seek war,
causing backlash from the plebeian tribunes. Livy told us that he “either yielded to force or to a
sense of shame and resigned the dictatorship.”362 Even after his resignation, the former dictator
was put on trial. It is unclear why Lucius Manlius was selected for the dictatorship in the first
place, as his reputation was poor. Besides his initial indiscretion, he imposed a detested levy,
“was loathed for his violent temper,” and mistreated his son.363 Needless to say, he was
unpopular. Lucius Manlius was not punished, but only because his blindly loyal son threatened
suicide in retaliation for any charge against his father.364
The entire case was extreme and underlined the strangeness of a dictator being obliged to
resign. Livy may have also villainized Lucius Manlius to underline his dishonorable actions.
Although Lucius Manlius probably had the imperium to conduct war, he defied the unofficial
constraints and expectations of his appointment. Seeking military glory was selfish, not for the
good of Rome. Notably, Livy depicted Manlius’s power being checked by the plebeian tribunes,
who were tasked with defending the rights of the people. This dictatorship occurred after all
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previously discussed resignations. So, Manlius’s indictment was representative of the people’s
rising power. Plebeians still experienced significant oppression during this time. Yet, the people
were able to impact “the thunderbolt of the dictatorship,” which revealed that changes were
slowly beginning.365 In earlier years, dictators generally had full agency, as they resigned on
their own terms. Manlius was essentially forced out of his office, which reflected subtle
decreases in the aristocracy’s dominance.
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IV. Conclusion
By understanding the Roman dictatorship as a dynamic and practical component of the
Republican political system, the office is demystified. While we remain unsure of many
legalities and specifics, the dictatorship’s role is still traceable. As Livy succinctly described, it
was “the usual practice in times of crisis.”366 Importantly, crises were not always military
matters. As Rome’s emergencies changed, so did dictatorship. The early Roman Republic was an
aristocracy, run by a largely “closed” system of wealthy families.367 Appointing a dictator was
not a deviation from the existing power structure, but rather a vital emergency protocol. The
appointment of a dictator was an effective solution for the specific crises of the time. A dictator
calmed domestic riots, intimidated enemies, and streamlined military efforts, which at the same
time reinforced aristocratic dominance.
Significantly, the Republic began as a small agrarian city-state. Near the founding of the
Republic, 25,000 to 40,000 Romans were living in a territory of less than 1,000 square
kilometers, about three-quarters the size of modern-day Rome.368 Conflicts were also close to
home, meaning the military was focused on fighting near-by battles. This meant a dictator could
reach the field quickly. Dictators were appointed for largely local emergencies from a small and
restrictive governing class. Early Republican officials largely earned their entry into politics by
birthright. Subsequently, the dictatorship was also able to act as a stopgap for the amateurish
politics of any underqualified magistrates. If the consuls of the year were performing poorly, a
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dictator allowed the Republic to reinstate a trusted politician. This evolved as the ranks of the
elite opened slightly.
The shift away from a small patrician aristocracy may have increased the overall quality of
Rome’s politicians and created a system that was less cohesive, but ultimately more stable (for a
period of time).369 Not only was there a greater variety of offices, but there was also fiercer
competition to obtain them.370 In reference to Camillus, Livy wrote, “Rome would never have
need of a dictator if she had such men in office, men so united in heart, as ready to obey
command, and contributing glory to the common stock rather than drawing it from their own
interests.”371 Although political motivations are never so purely patriotic, perhaps such a change
began to occur.
Over the next few centuries, Rome expanded tremendously. Growing to the size of Delaware,
Rome held over 5,000 kilometers and almost 350,000 citizens by 338 BCE.372 Inopportunely, we
have lost Livy’s narrative for most of the third century BCE (about 291-222 BCE). Before the
interruption, Livy ominously wrote that a 292 BCE plague, “was thought to be an evil omen.”373
When his history resumed in 222 BCE, the Second Punic War was brewing just as both Rome
and Carthage were “at the peak of their prosperity and power.”374 Livy implied that dictators had
not been used for many years, although recent appointments were listed in certain fasti.375 By
this time, Rome had swelled to about the size of Massachusetts, with 26,805 square kilometers
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and 900,000 citizens. 376 During this “most memorable war in history,” Livy reported many
peculiar uses of the dictatorship, including two simultaneous dictators and an “acting-dictator”
appointed by the people.377 Rome was fighting stronger enemies, further from home, with more
complex military operations.378 It follows that one of Rome’s oldest political institutions
underwent modifications to suit an entirely different political landscape.
The remaining question is why this adaptable institution eventually disappeared. While the
Roman dictatorship offered exceptional flexibility, it was ultimately created for a bygone
political system. The dictatorship’s irregular uses during the Second Punic War showed the
furthest evolutionary limits of the dictatorship. By the end of the war, the Republic was operating
under new offices and new systems that superseded the dictator. While Mommsen believed that
dictatorships were discontinued because of public hatred, it is more likely that office was not
needed.379 Rome’s emergencies were now large-scale wars, not nearby battles or domestic
rioting. Opportunities for nondictatorial command positions also increased throughout the
Republic. In many cases, longer term, less powerful commanders were more suited to the current
conflicts.380 Praetorships and prorogations (extensions of command) may have also helped to
replace dictatorships.381 Scipio Africanus’s famous campaigns in his namesake continent allowed
him to hold power (as general or consul) for over a decade.382 Unlike a dictator, Scipio’s third
century BCE mission was “not limited by a definite date.”383 Scipio was the hero of the Second
Punic War, so a lengthier period proved to be useful.
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The dictatorship was suited to increase efficiency for the small city-state of Rome, not the
full-fledged Republic. By the third century BCE, the domination of one man was less practical.
The Second Punic War also saw clearer laws and expectations on officials in the field, as they
were greater in number and further from home.384 A dictator was far less manageable than
magistrates with inferior power, which may have also contributed. The dictatorial appointments
of the Second Punic War diverged from custom and appear anomalous, but perhaps only because
we are missing a century of Rome’s progress in Livy. By understanding the greater arc of
change, it is still evident that Rome had suitably altered the dictatorship, as well as their whole
political framework. These various alterations in the Republic may have made dictators
unnecessary, perhaps explaining why the position went out of use after 201 BCE.
In other words, the dictatorship vanished for the same reasons it was trusted for multiple
centuries. As Livy’s detailed narrative reflected, the Republic was a time of massive
development and political innovation. As the sovereignty of the people was amplified and Rome
itself grew, even fundamental concepts like imperium changed. Rome was able to expand and
succeed because of its willingness to adjust old traditions to the constant evolutions of the state.
The dictatorship had to be altered because Rome’s political structure had fundamentally
changed, meaning the office ultimately outlived its usefulness.
Consequently, there is also room to reconsider the divergent dictatorships of Sulla and
Caesar. In 82 BCE, Lucius Cornelius Sulla was essentially granted a permanent dictatorship.385
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From 49 to 44 BCE, Gaius Julius Caesar held four consecutive dictatorships, before officially
becoming dictator perpetuo.386 Rome was no longer controlled by a small elite, which meant
both late dictators were able to use mass support to enable individualistic power grabs. 387
Whereas traditional dictators were trusted to act in the best interest of the state, Sulla and Caesar
used popular sovereignty to reinstate kinglike rule.388
Both of their dictatorships represented the kind of mob-rule that Livy disparaged. He spoke
with contempt of Athenian democracy, critiquing that, “there is never any lack at Athens of
tongues ready and willing to stir up the passions of the common people; this kind of oratory is
nurtured by the applause of the mob in all free communities.” 389 Caesar and Sulla resembled
Greek tyrants or even Roman kings,390 but not the traditional Republican dictatorship. Flower
wrote that Romans saw tyranny as equivalent to “lawlessness,”391 which arguably characterized
the largely extralegal rises of Sulla and Caesar. Emergency dictators were not meant to upset the
balance of power, but to preserve the Republic amidst dire circumstances. Conversely, the later
dictators sought to win all control for themselves. Nonetheless, these new formations of the
dictatorship still reflected a changed political system; the old aristocracy of the Republic was
utterly deteriorated, and true supreme rule could be seized with popular support. As a result,
perhaps the convention of isolating these two dictators is flawed. I still find Sulla and Caesar to
be distinct from the dictatorships considered in this investigation. Yet, Sulla and Caesar clearly
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have a place in the lineage of the dictatorship. The implications of these abnormal dictatorships
require further examination. Just as Livy’s dictators mirror the evolution of the early Republic’s
aristocracy, Sulla and Caesar surely reflect the transformation and collapse of late Republican
politics.
I do not intend this study to offer a conclusive portrait of the dictatorship. Regrettably, many
facts about dictators have been lost to time. Instead, I hope to offer a methodology for continuing
our examination of the dictatorship. Many aspects of the office’s history are not challenged,
often because the discipline is inclined to trust Mommsen’s word. The work of Lintott and
Flower, cited often in this study, attempted to revise standard narratives of the Republic. I offer a
modest imitation of this method, which is meant to illuminate gaps in research and point to
topics that deserve further investigation. Livy’s narrative approach offers a unique window into
the nuances of each dictatorship. While I have chosen Livy as a useful basis for this study, a
similar methodology could be applied to any ancient historian, offering a different perspective on
the dictatorship or any other political institution.
Arguments that delve into the minutiae of the dictatorship often become prescriptive, a
mistake which often disregards the remarkable adaptability of Roman politics. Scholars that see
the dictatorship as exceptionally monarchial or undemocratic have often lost sight of the wider
scope of Republican politics. The dictatorship must be considered in the context of Rome’s
evolution from a small aristocratic state to a burgeoning world power which experimented with
more inclusive politics. Close examination demonstrates that the dictatorship was not a political
anomaly, but an effective tool of Roman government. Furthermore, this investigation highlights
the problematic nature of representing Rome as anything near democratic. The Republic took
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small steps towards popular sovereignty, yet the dictatorship persisted due to some glaringly
aristocratic aspects of Rome’s Republican political structure.
Despite conventional thought, the use of dictators was not remarkable or uniquely
undemocratic, but consistent with Roman political practices.392 The Republic was able to persist
for many centuries because it was responsive and constantly adjusted to changing circumstances.
The dictatorship, an ancient and esteemed office, is a perfect representation of Rome’s ability to
adapt while honoring their history. The Republic’s political development—especially Livy’s
retelling of it—is characterized by tension between tradition and practical modifications.393
Rigidly legalistic discussions of the dictatorship often fall short, because they attempt to
condense centuries of innovation into neat official rules that simply did not exist. In the end,
Livy’s dictators act as an ideal microcosm of the continual adaptation and complexity of the
Republic’s constitution.
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Appendix
a. Dictators in Livy
Approximate
Date

Appearance
in Livy

501 BCE

2. 18

496 BCE

2. 19-20

Aulus Postumius

494 BCE

2. 30-31

Manlius Valerius

458 BCE

3. 26-29

Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus

439 BCE

4. 13-16

Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus

437 BCE

4. 17-20

Mamercus Aemilius

435 BCE

4. 21-22

Aulus Servilis

434 BCE

4. 23-4. 24

431 BCE

4. 26-29

Aulus Postumius Tubertus

426 BCE

4. 31-.34

Mamercus Aemilius

418 BCE

4. 46-47

Quintus Servilius Priscus

408 BCE

4. 57

396 BCE

5. 19-23

Marcus Furius Camillus

390 BCE

5. 46-55

Marcus Furius Camillus

389 BCE

6. 2-4

Marcus Furius Camillus

385 BCE

6. 11-16

Aulus Cornelius Cossus

380 BCE

6. 28-29

Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus

368 BCE

6. 38

368 BCE

6. 39-42

367 BCE

6. 42

Marcus Furius Camillus

363 BCE

7. 3-4

Lucius Manlius Imperiosus

Name
Titus Lartius

Mamercus Aemilius

Note
or other, like Manlius Valerius,
Livy found his identity to be
uncertain.

First dictatorship (see also 439
BCE)
Second dictatorship (see also 458
BCE)
First dictatorship (see also 434,
426 BCE)
Surname is either Priscus or
Structus, Livy is unsure.
Second dictatorship (see also 437,
426 BCE)

Third dictatorship (see also 437,
434 BCE)

Publius Cornelius

Marcus Furius Camillus

First dictatorship (see also 390,
389, 368, 367 BCE)
Second dictatorship (see also 396,
389, 368, 367 BCE)
Third dictatorship (see also 396,
390, 368, 367 BCE)

Fourth dictatorship (see also 396,
390, 389, 367 BCE)

Publius Manlius
Fifth dictatorship (see also 396,
390, 389, 368 BCE)
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362 BCE

7 .6-8

Appius Claudius

361 BCE

7. 9-.10

Titus Quinctius Poenus

360 BCE

7. 11

Quintus Servilius Ahala

358 BCE

7. 12-15

356-357 BCE

7. 17

353 BCE

7. 19-21

Titus Manlius (Torquatus)

352 BCE

7. 20-22

Gaius Julius

351 BCE

7. 22

350 BCE

7. 24-25

Lucius Furius Camillus

348 BCE

7. 26

Titus Manlius Torquatus

347-345 BCE

7. 28

Lucius Furius Camillus

347-345 BCE

7. 28

Publius Valerius Publicola

342 BCE

7. 38-42

Marcus Valerius Corvus

340 BCE

8. 12

Lucius Papirius Crassus

339 BCE

8. 12

Quintus Publilius Philo

338-337 BCE

8. 15

Gaius Claudius Inregillensis

336-332 BCE

8. 16

Lucius Aemilius Mamercinus

336-332 BCE

8. 17

Publius Cornelius Rufinus

332 BCE

8. 17

Marcus Papirius Crassus

332-331 BCE

8. 18

Gnaeus Quinctilius

327 BCE

8. 23

Marcus Claudius Marcellus

325 BCE

8. 29-37

Lucius Papirius Cursor

323-322 BCE

8. 38-40

Aulus Cornelius Arvina

321 BCE

9. 7

Gaius Sulpicius
Gaius Marcius Rutulus
First dictatorship (see also 348
BCE)

Marcus Fabius

Quintus Fabius Ambustus

First dictatorship (see also 347-345
BCE)
Second dictatorship (see also 353
BCE)
Second dictatorship (see also 350
BCE)

First dictatorship (see also 310
BCE)
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321 BCE

9. 7

Marcus Aemilius Papus

320-319 BCE

9. 15-16

Lucius Cornelius

317-315 BCE

9. 21

Lucius Aemilius

316-315 BCE

9. 22-24

Quintus Fabius

314 BCE

9. 26

Gaius Maenius

313-312 BCE

9. 28

Gaius Poetelius

313-312 BCE

9. 29

Gaius Junius Babulcus

310 BCE

9. 38-40

Lucius Papirius Cursor

306 BCE

9. 44

302 BCE

10. 1-2

Gaius Junius Babulcus

302 BCE

10. 3-5

Marcus Valerius Maximus

First dictatorship (see also 302
BCE)
Second dictatorship (see also 325
BCE)

Publius Cornelius Scipio
Second dictatorship (see also 313312 BCE)

Break in Livy’s History
217-216 BCE

22. 8- 32

Quintus Fabius Maximus

216 BCE

22. 33

216 BCE

22. 57-23. 31

216 BCE

23. 22-23

215 BCE

25. 2

Gaius Claudius Centho

210 BCE

27. 5-6

Quintus Fulvius Flaccus

207 BCE

27. 29-35

Titus Manlius Torquatus

206 BCE

28. 1

204 BCE

29. 10-11

Quintus Caecilius Metellus

203 BCE

30. 24-26

Publius Sulpicius

201 BCE

30. 39-40

Gaius Servilius Geminus

Lucius Venturius Philo
Marcus Junius Pera
Marcus Fabius Buteo

Marcus Livius

Second dictatorship (as stated in
Livy), “acting-dictator,” interregni
causa
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b. The Fasti
Fasti were annalistic lists of elected officials, military triumphs, and other public events.
Several of these records have survived, called the fasti annales. They were a key source and
formed an outline of Roman politics for annalistic historians like Livy.394 Fasti were often
engraved on monuments and arches. The Fasti Capitolini, one of the most significant records for
Roman history (and dictators in particular), is thought to have been originally displayed in the
Forum.395 It was rebuilt from fragments during the Renaissance, and now resides in Rome’s
Capitoline Museum. The Fasti Capitolini has its own set of limitations, which exemplify the
issues with relying on fasti (especially in studying the dictatorship). Despite providing a simple
list of names and dates, fasti were likely created with specific political motivations, making this
information undependable.396 The Fasti Capitolini was commissioned by Augustus during his
reign for the purpose of public display, rewritten from old records.397 The list was reconstructed
and intended as a monument, which certainly created considerable incentive for exaggeration or
falsification. Most fasti were likely incomplete and compiled centuries after the fact, which
means that they must be used carefully when trying to recreate the dictatorship’s earliest
history.398
Unfortunately, we know little about dictators during the gap in Livy from 291 to 219 BCE.
Details about this time are largely uncertain, in part because Livy is a crucial source for early
Roman history. Although the Fasti Capitolini lists just under twenty appointments, not all entries

Livy relied heavily on the fasti, so any faults in the annals may also be replicated in his work, see Forsythe, “The
Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 316; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 13; Armstrong, War and
Society, 26-27; Livy perhaps preferred them to other sources, see Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 69.
395
Beard, The Roman Triumph, 61-62.
396
Simpson, “The Original Site of the ‘Fasti Capitolini’,” 61; Drogula, Commanders & Command, 8-10, 16;
Raaflaub, “Between Myth and History,” 134; Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 302.
397
Forsythe, “The Beginning of the Roman Republic,” 154.
398
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 13, 218; Beard, The Roman Triumph, 61-62.
394
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are reliable. It is uncertain how many dictatorships occurred during this break, although
appointments almost certainly decreased. Several dictators from this period appear exclusively in
the Fasti Capitolini, which has provoked questions about their authenticity.399 If we trust Livy,
when his narrative resumed (just prior to the Second Punic War,) a long time had elapsed since
the last dictator.400
In 217 BCE, Livy wrote that “the government accordingly had recourse to the
appointment of a dictator, a remedy which for many years had been neither wanted nor
applied.”401 For several reasons, this is puzzling. For one, Livy implied that a long time has
passed since the last dictatorship. Even more significantly, he wrote that “the length of time had
almost blotted the meaning of the dictatorship from the minds of citizens and allies alike.”402
This contradicts the Fasti Capitolini, as it lists dictatorships in 224, 231, and 264 BCE.403 Livy
certainly believed much longer than seven years had elapsed. If we trust the Fasti Capitolini, the
last dictator was appointed less than ten years prior. Although this was to hold elections, so
perhaps Livy meant a dictator rei gerundae causa.404 Broughton made a general argument that
we should trust Livy over the politically-guided fasti, although Livy certainly had his own
objectives. Nonetheless, even within the Fasti Capitolini, dictators had become infrequent. So,
perhaps we can conclude that the dictatorship was—to some extent—less prevalent.
The fasti list many dictators throughout the Republic that Livy does not include, as well
as differing names and dates. Primarily, I use the Fasti Capitolini to determine the official
Kaplan, "Religious Dictators,” 172-175.
Livy 22. 8.
401
Livy 22. 8.
402
Livy 22. 11. Upon approaching the consul, Fabius “sent an officer to remind” the consul that “he much present
himself to the dictator without lictors.” This reaffirms Livy’s assertion that there had not been a dictator in recent
memory.
403
Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 58-60.
404
Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 58.
399
400
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reasons for a dictator’s appointment, as Livy is often unclear.405 When it bears relevance, I
discuss multiple instances in which Livy’s text contradicted the Fasti Capitolini. An in-depth
comparison of Livy’s text to any fasti would undoubtedly produce findings worthy of a
monograph. For the purposes of this study, I implement the fasti with caution and skepticism,
and only as they apply to Livy’s narrative.406

405
406

Most relevant for Chapter III-d “Circumstances for Appointment.”
This is good practice for all early Roman sources.

